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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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ROLE OF PARTY IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 3-11

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen A. Laurygin: "Lenin's Teachings on the Communist Party and Their Further Development in the CPSU Documents"]

[Excerpt] 4. The CPSU and the Questions of Military Organizational Development

The CPSU has carried out military organizational development in close unity and relationship to the solving of political, economic, social and ideological problems. The objective necessity of party leadership over the Armed Forces was reflected in December 1918 in the Decree of the RKP [Russian Communist Party] Central Committee "On the Policy of the Military Department," where it was pointed out that "the policy of the military department, like all other departments and institutions, is carried out on the precise basis of the general directives issued by the party in the form of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision."²⁰ The CPSU Program states that "the foundation of military organizational development is the leadership of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces...."²¹

In setting military policy, the party proceeds from the view that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of aggressive wars also remains. In this regard the CPSU views the strengthening of national defense capability and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces as one of its main tasks. The party has been concerned with the equipping of the Army and Navy with modern combat equipment and weapons as well as improving the defense industry. Great attention has been given to solving the fundamental military-theoretical problems, and in particular to investigating the question of the possibility of preventing war and maintaining a military equilibrium.

In developing Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and the Leninist teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, the CPSU has improved Soviet military doctrine. "...Our military doctrine," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "has a strictly defensive focus. The nature of the Soviet Armed Forces, the principles of their organizational development,

strategy and tactics of their use have been set up and are set up with the intention of repelling aggression and the threats which derive from imperialism against us and our friends."²²

The party has given particular attention to increasing the moral-political potential of the Army and Navy. Proof of this are the Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" and "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" as well as the new revisions of the Regulations on the Political Bodies and Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy. Under the party's leadership, measures have been carried out to improve the content, forms and methods of party political work as well as the structure of the party political apparatus; the institution of deputy commanders for political affairs has been established in the companies, batteries, squadrons and equivalent subunits.

The party's line of strengthening the nation's defense capability has been reflected in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress: "In the report period, the party and state not for a single day overlooked the questions of **strengthening the nation's defense capability and its Armed Forces**. The international situation obliges us to do this."²³

The necessity of increasing the level of party leadership over military organizational development under present-day conditions has been determined by a number of factors. In the first place, there is the complexity and contradictoriness of the international situation and the increased responsibility of the Soviet Armed Forces for preserving peace in the world. "We are well aware," emphasized Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the Extraordinary November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "that you cannot entreat peace from the imperialists. It must be defended, relying solely on the unshakable might of the Soviet Armed Forces."²⁴

Secondly, the greater leading role of the CPSU in the Armed Forces has been brought about by the qualitative changes in military affairs, by the increased connection and interdependence between the state's military organization and its economic, political and cultural system. Our army with its present structure, technical equipping and developed control and command system is a multifaceted, very complex social organism. To successfully lead it, to direct the efforts of many troop collectives toward the single goal are possible only on the basis of a unified party policy and with the strict conformity of the elaborated strategic course to the demands of Marxist-Leninist science.

Thirdly, the greater leading role of the CPSU in military organizational development is determined by the fact that the role of the spiritual, ideological factors has increased in strengthening national defense and the Armed Forces. To ensure the ever-increasing moral-political and psychological superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the aggressor armies is possible only by the Communist Party, by its indefatigable ideological and organizational work and by the personal example of the communists in the able and unstinting fulfillment of military duty.

Fourthly, the international tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces have grown wider. They must defend not only their own country against the aggressors, but also the entire socialist commonwealth along with the armies of the other fraternal countries. The elaboration of collective defensive measures and the coordinating of military efforts by the Warsaw Pact states increase the role of the CPSU in leadership over the Soviet Armed Forces, in the international indoctrination of the Soviet military and in strengthening their ties with the men of the socialist commonwealth armies.

"The path followed by the Leninist party," pointed out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party," "is truly a heroic path of struggle and victories. Under its leadership grandiose changes have been carried out which have had a decisive impact not only on the destiny of the nation, but have also fundamentally changed the course of world history.²⁵ The Soviet people see in the communist party their tested leader. Unity, the monolithic solidarity of the people and the men of the Army and Navy with the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee and the ardent desire of millions of Soviet people to carry out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and to devote all their forces to further strengthening the economic and defense might of the socialist motherland are major factors in the progress of Soviet society toward communism.

FOOTNOTES

- 20 "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuz. Dokumenty 1917-1981" [The CPSU on the Soviet Armed Forces. Documents 1917-1981], Voenizdat, 1981, p 42.
- 21 "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 112.
- 22 PRAVDA, 12 July 1982.
- 23 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.
- 24 PRAVDA, 13 November 1982.
- 25 Ibid., 5 April 1983.

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WORLD WAR II: DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY ART

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 12-20

[Article by Professor, Col Gen F. Gayvoronskiy: "Certain Trends in the Development of Soviet Military Art from the Experience of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War provided a serious impetus for the development of military art. This was brought about by the unprecedented scope of the armed conflict, by the complexity in the balance of political forces and by the decisiveness of the aims of the sides. A major role was played by the development of weaponry. Aircraft, tanks and submarines gained mass employment. Rocket artillery appeared. Radio technical [radar] equipment was used on a significant scale. The employment of new, more powerful and destructive weapons made it possible "to achieve new, more grandiose results."¹

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet troops conducted over 50 operations by groups of fronts, around 250 front-level operations and thousands of engagements and battles, a majority of which stood out in originality of concept, in the creative carrying out of the set tasks and by the high combat skill of the commanders and all the personnel. Soviet military art was enriched with the experience of conducting an armed struggle on fronts of enormous length and the able use of all the resources for achieving victory. It proved its complete superiority over the military art of Nazi Germany. This experience has maintained its significance under present-day conditions. "The party," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "teaches us, the military, to steadily and purposefully investigate the experience of the war and in an innovative manner to analyze the profound processes, most important patterns and trends in the development of military affairs.... Only on the basis of a thorough analysis of the relationship of past and present events is it possible to establish the dialectical succession of military affairs and on this basis creatively improve them and raise them to a new, qualitative level."²

The development of Soviet military art during the years of the Great Patriotic War shows its on-going change and improvement. In the course of this development, certain new trends were disclosed which are of important significance also under present-day conditions.

Particularly apparent was the trend for a greater significance for the seizing of the strategic initiative and holding it in the course of armed combat. As is known, the treacherous and surprise attack on the Soviet Union by fully mobilized Nazi troops in June 1941 and the delayed bringing of the Soviet Western military districts to full combat readiness made it possible for the Nazi army to cause us serious losses, to sharply change the balance of forces in their favor and to seize the strategic initiative. The situation was extremely exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Army had not completed its strategic deployment and mobilization, the economy had not been fully shifted over to the output of military products while the defense industry in the USSR Western regions was forced to curtail production and move to the East. In this situation, the struggle for strategic initiative assumed a protracted and extremely difficult nature.

In order to seize the initiative from the hands of the enemy it was essential first of all to check the advance of its troops, to stabilize the strategic front, to gain time for completing the mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces, to reorganize the economy on a wartime footing, to defeat the main assault enemy groupings and by going over to a decisive counteroffensive to alter the course of the armed struggle in our favor.

In the course of 5 months' fierce engagements against superior forces of the Nazi troops and the armies of their allies and in the active defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Rostov and Stavropol, the Soviet command was able to bleed the enemy, to thwart its offensive plans, to gain time for concentrating large strategic reserves in the main, Moscow sector and by going over to a counter-offensive and then a general offensive to successfully rout the large enemy groupings and seize the strategic initiative.

However, as a consequence of the unsuccessful outcome of the operations conducted by the Soviet Army in May-June 1942, the situation on the front changed in favor of the enemy and the strategic initiative was again in its hands. Strategic defense for a second during the war became the basic type of military operations for the Soviet Army.

The struggle to capture strategic initiative again demanded an enormous straining of forces on the part of the Soviet Army and all the people. All the work of the party, state and military bodies was aimed at organizing a stubborn defense, defeating the enemy assault groupings and changing the strategic situation on the Soviet-German Front in our favor.

Due to the unceasing activities of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, in a short period of time the development of industry was completed, the output of weapons and military equipment increased sharply and by the end of 1942, the troops were being technically reequipped. Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] reinforced the troops on the fronts of the southwestern sector with strategic reserves. The construction of the Stalingrad defensive perimeters commenced in the autumn of 1941 was resumed in the zone between the Volga and the Don. Counterstrikes were made against the enemy groupings which had broken through. Air operations increased sharply.

In the stubborn defensive engagements developing in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus, due to the unprecedented heroism of the Soviet troops and to the skillful leadership of combat operations by the command and the staffs, the main grouping of the Nazi army on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front had been bled white and with the going over to the offensive, it suffered a decisive defeat. For a second time, strategic initiative shifted into the hands of the Soviet Command.

The defeat of the Nazi troops in the course of the winter campaign of 1942-1943 undermined the military might and morale of the German Army and population as well as its prestige among its allies. In order to prevent the collapse of the Nazi bloc, the Nazi leadership decided to conduct a major summer offensive on the Soviet-German Front.

Under these conditions, the Soviet command was confronted with the task of checking the enemy's plans and preventing it from seizing the strategic initiative. Regardless of the fact that the balance of forces existing by the summer of 1943 would have allowed the Soviet Army to continue the offensive, Hq SHC took a decision to temporarily go over to an intentional defensive, to bleed the enemy assault groupings and to create conditions for going over to a counteroffensive and then a general offensive.

For checking the summer offensive of the Nazi troops and retaining the strategic initiative, the Supreme High Command carried out a number of major measures. In the probable sectors of the enemy advance, a strong defense was organized including five or six defensive zones (lines). Along with this, a defensive line was prepared by the troops of the Steppe District and along the left bank of the Don, a state defensive line. The overall depth of defense for the Soviet troops reached 250-300 km.³ In the aim of winning superiority in the air, in the spring and in the beginning of the summer of 1943, two major air operations were conducted. In benefiting from the lull in active operations, Hq SHC filled out the fronts with personnel, weapons, combat equipment, materiel and reserves. At the beginning of June, in the strategic reserve there were nine combined-arms armies, two tank armies and one air army.⁴ The command, the staffs and the political bodies did enormous work to ready the troops for a strong, insurmountable defense and to ensure a high offensive zeal among the personnel. The central staff of the partisan movement organized in the enemy rear powerful strikes against the Nazi lines of communications over an extensive territory.

As a result of the enormous efforts of the Soviet Supreme High Command and the heroic actions by the troops, the attempt of the Nazi leadership to seize the strategic initiative and turn the course of the war in its favor during the battle of Kursk suffered a complete defeat. The strategic initiative once and for all went over into the hands of the Soviet Command and favorable conditions were created for developing an overall strategic initiative.

Thus, the practice of the Great Patriotic War showed the ever-increasing significance of the struggle to seize and retain the strategic initiative and the exacerbation of this struggle as the technical equipping of the troops rose. A characteristic trait was also the great length and fierceness of the struggle to win and retain the strategic initiative. As has been pointed out in

the foreign military press, under the condition of a parity of the belligerent forces, the problem of the struggle to seize and retain strategic initiative in modern strategic operations can assume even greater timeliness.

In the course of the war, there was a clear trend for increasing the spatial scope of the strategic offenses being carried out by offensive actions by all the Armed Forces according to the overall concept and plan of Hq SHC for achieving the strategic aims. This trend is clearly apparent in the given Table 1. [See the following page.]

An analysis of the table's data indicates that as the strike and fire power of the Soviet Armed Forces increased, as they won and firmly kept the strategic initiative and the balance of forces changed in favor of the Soviet Army, the scale of the strategic offensives increased and the spatial indicators and results of military operations grew. While in 1941-1943, a strategic initiative was conducted predominantly on one or several strategic sectors, in the campaigns of 1944-1945 in Europe, the entire Soviet-German Front was encompassed in active offensive operations. This trend was explained not only by the increased resources, but also by the on-going improvement in military art. Its high level was apparent in the skillful choice of the sectors for the main strikes which were made where the greatest results could be achieved.

A major accomplishment of Soviet military art was the organizing and successful execution of operations to surround and destroy large enemy groupings (Stalingrad, Iasi-Kishinev, Berlin and others). Depending upon the specific conditions of the situation, various methods of routing the enemy were employed such as dividing (Lwow-Sandomierz and Vistula-Oder Operations) and breaking up (Belorussian Operation) the strategic front with the successive encirclement and destruction of the isolated enemy groupings. In increasing the scope of the offensive operations, of great importance was the skillful employment of the mobile groups, second echelons and reserves of the armies and fronts. These were committed to battle in the aim of developing a rapid advance deep in the enemy defenses, routing its operational reserves, seizing defensive lines without a halt, cutting the lines of retreat for large groupings and ensuring their encirclement or the unceasing pursuit of retreating troops to a great depth.

All of this ultimately led not only to an increased spatial scope, but also to great results from military operations. Thus, in the winter of 1942-1943, the southern wing of the Nazi troops was defeated including the three army groups A, B and Don and in the course of the 1944 summer-autumn campaign, four groups including: North, Center, Northern Ukraine and Southern Ukraine.

It must be emphasized that the tendency for an increased scale, the greater spatial scope and decisiveness of military operations has continued to develop under present-day conditions as well. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, nuclear missile weapons and other means of mass destruction as well as conventional, but more accurate, efficient and long-range weapons, high mobility and maneuverability of the personnel and weapons can lead to a further rise in the scale and intensity of military operations. In the West, particularly in the United States, a tendency can be seen to involve not only the land and ocean theaters of military operations and air space in the orbit of military operations, but also space, too.

Table 1

Scale of Strategic Offense by Soviet Armed Forces*

Campaign	Length of Front (km)		Number of Simultaneously Involved Fronts	Employed Resources			Depth of Troop Advance, km
	Total	Concurrent Offensive		Guns & Mortars	Tanks & Self-propelled Artillery Mounts	Aircraft	
1941-42 winter campaign	Over 4,000	To 2,000	9	22,600	2,000	2,200	150-400
1943 summer-autumn campaign	Over 4,300	Over 2,000	9	105,000	10,200	10,200	300-600
1944 summer-autumn campaign	4,500	4,500	11	98,100	7,100	12,900	600-1,100
1945 campaign in Europe	2,200	2,100	9	107,300	12,100	14,700	800

* "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 12, 1982, p 283.

In the course of the war, there was a rather clear tendency for the further development of the forms of strategic operations. As is known, on the eve and at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the frontal operation was considered to be the basic form of conducting military operations for the Soviet Armed Forces. In the course of this operation, the strategic goal was to be achieved. However, the very first offensive operations of the Soviet Army showed that it was very difficult to achieve major military-political goals in a strategic sector or theater of military operations with just the forces of a single front. For this purpose, the efforts of several fronts had to be combined, the long-range aviation, the National Air Defense Troops and the strategic reserves had to be involved as well as the naval formations and units on the coastal sectors and all of these had to be employed according to a single concept and plan, under the single leadership of Hq SHC.

A new form of conducting armed combat--an operation by a group of fronts--became widely employed. After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad and Kursk, successive and simultaneous strategic offensive operations by groups of fronts came to hold a firm place in Soviet military art. These were conducted on the most important strategic sectors and were marked by a decisiveness of goals, by great spatial scope and by high maneuverability and dynamicness. Certain of the operations were initiated in a zone 1,000 and more kilometers wide (the counteroffensive at Moscow, the Belorussian and Baltic Operations of 1944) while the Manchurian was along a front of 2,700 km; they were conducted to a depth of 500 km and more (Belorussian and Vistula-Oder). The depth of the Manchurian Operation reached 800 km. Usually from 100 to 200 divisions, 20,000-40,000 guns and mortars, 3,000-6,000 tanks and 2,000-7,500 aircraft were involved in conducting operations by groups of fronts.⁵ In the course of them from 50 (Stalingrad) to 90 and more divisions (Berlin, Manchurian) were defeated and major military-political and strategic results were obtained.

It is essential to point out that the tendency for the forms of military operations which appeared during the years of the Great Patriotic War to evolve has continued to develop in the postwar period. With the appearance of new long-range and effective weapons, the combat capabilities of the field forces and formations have increased sharply. In line with this, under present-day conditions, a strategic operation in a theater of military operations can be the basic form of armed combat for achieving the military-political and strategic goals of a war. This strategic operation in terms of spatial parameters, the dynamics of military operations and set goals can surpass the World War II operations by several-fold.

One of the basic trends which appeared during the years of the last war is the increased role of fire in carrying out the tasks of destroying enemy personnel, combat equipment, engineer works and rear installations. This trend was expressed in the theoretical elaboration and actual implementation of the artillery and air offensive as a most effective factor for the fire damage to the enemy.

During the first period of the war, as a consequence of the limited amount of artillery and tanks, the density of guns in the breakthrough sectors was low. Ordinarily it was 50-55 guns and mortars and 4-5 tanks per kilometer. During

the period of the preparatory fire, the enemy was hit with fire to a depth of 2-4 km and to a degree which did not exceed 15-20 percent. As a result of the few aircraft and the enemy supremacy in the air, our air units and formations basically operated periodically and without sufficient effectiveness. All of this inevitably led to a reduced rate of advance, to great losses, to a rapid decline in the battleworthiness of the troops and to a reduced depth of the operations.

The experience of the war showed that a maximum effectiveness of fire damage could be achieved under the condition of the integrated use of the guns in accord with the commander's overall concept and the plans of the staffs.

In the subsequent periods of the war, particularly from the summer of 1943, due to the increased number and quality of artillery, bomber and ground attack aviation, with the use of the artillery and air offensive and the better ammunition supply of the troops, the dependability of fire damage increased sharply. Artillery density in the breakthrough areas in a majority of the operations began to be from 120 to 230 and more guns and mortars (of 76-mm caliber and over) per kilometer of front sector. The level of hitting the enemy rose to 25-30 percent and sometimes even higher for troops located in the first two positions. The depth of the simultaneous neutralization of enemy defenses by artillery fire reached 8-10 km,⁶ and in individual sectors 12-16 km. Artillery infantry support (along with air defense in 1941-1942) more often was provided by a rolling barrage (single, double and sometimes even triple) to a depth of 4-6 km.

Aviation made massed bomb strikes, starting from the second position of the main enemy defensive zone and to a depth of its entire second zone (the positions of the corps reserves). The density of the bomb strikes during a period of the air softening-up increased from 5-10 tons per km² in 1943 up to 50-60 tons and more in the operations of 1944-1945 (72 tons in the Berlin Operation and 102 tons in the Lwow-Sandomierz) per km² of breakthrough sector in the enemy defenses.

Dependable and deep fire damage to the enemy had a great impact on increasing the pace of crossing (breaking through) the tactical defensive zone, it created good conditions for committing the mobile groups and second echelons to the engagement and for rapidly developing the tactical success into an operational level and helped to increase the depth of the operation and achieve the set goals in a short time.

At present, when the armies are armed with long-range and more destructive than hitherto weapons, the role of fire damage in carrying out the task of destroying opposing troop groupings can increase sharply. Its effectiveness, in the opinion of the command of foreign armies, rises sharply under the condition of the integrated employment of the weapons combined with continuous reconnaissance, well-organized control and all-round support.

In operational art, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the trend for concentrating the basic resources of the fronts and armies for making decisive strikes in the selected sectors gained significant development. In an offensive, the massing of the resources in the sectors of the main thrusts was the

most important condition for securely neutralizing the enemy defenses, for the successful breaking through of them and for developing the success at a rapid pace and to a great depth. After the issuing of the directive of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942 on an offensive by assault groupings, the fronts and armies began to more decisively mass their resources in narrow sectors at the expense of the maximum weakening of the secondary sectors (see Table 2).

Table 2

Massing of Resources in Offensive Operations in Fronts by Great Patriotic War*

Operations	Width of zone of advance, km	Total Width of Breakthrough Areas		Amount of Resources in Breakthrough Sectors (in % of total number)		
		km	in % of total width of zone of advance	Rifle troops	Artillery	Tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts
Barvenkovo-Lozovaya (Southern Front, Jan 1942)	240	115	50	50	50	80
Stalingrad (Southwestern Front, Nov 1942)	250	67	27	60	80	50
Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy (2d Ukrainian Front, Jan-Feb 1944)	260	19	7	30	30	80
Iasi-Kishinev (2d Ukrainian Front, Aug 1944)	330	16	5	50	50	76
Vistula-Oder (1st Belorussian Front, Jan 1945)	230	17	7	52	65	65
East Prussian (2d Belorussian Front, Jan 1945)	250	39	16	78	89	100

* See "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba, 1973, pp 301-302.

As can be seen from the given table, during the operations of the third period of the war, in the breakthrough areas which comprise 7-16 percent of the total zone of advance, the fronts concentrated from 50 to 78 percent of the rifle troops, from 50 to 89 percent of the artillery and from 76 to 100 percent of the tanks.

The skillful massing of the resources in the crucial sectors ensured a 3-5-fold superiority over the enemy in personnel, 5-8-fold in artillery and tanks and 3-5-fold in aviation. Such massing was caused by the increased depth of enemy defenses and by the decisiveness of the aims of the operations to rout the large Nazi groupings and support the development of the offensive to a great depth.

In the course of the war, the skill of massing the men and weapons on the defensive also increased. While in the initial period the rifle divisions in the most important sectors defended zones from 10 to 20 km, subsequently the average operational density per division was already 6-9 km and in certain operations did not exceed 3 km.

Particularly high densities of personnel and weapons were created under conditions when the troops went over to the defensive intentionally, planning on the successful repulsing of the enemy strikes and the subsequent going over to a counteroffensive. Thus, the Central Front on the defensive at Kursk focused its basic efforts on the sector of the main thrust by the Nazi troops in an area 32 km wide comprising 11 percent of the total defensive zone of the front. Concentrated in this sector were 30 percent of all the rifle divisions, 50 percent of the artillery attached to the front and 87 percent of the tanks. Another example of the skillful massing of resources would be the defense of the Third Ukrainian Front at Lake Balaton. Three combined-arms armies, two tanks corps and one mechanized corps were deployed in an area of 80 km on the sector of the expected main enemy thrust. Only two combined-arms armies defended the remaining zone of the front's defenses more than 200 km long.⁷

In the tactics of combined-arms combat, one could most clearly see a trend toward increasing the depth of echeloning the units and formations both on the offensive and the defensive as well as the creating of new elements in the troop battle formations.

On an offensive, the necessity of echeloning the elements of the battle formation was caused by a change in the nature of enemy defenses and primarily by the increased number and depth of placement of its defensive positions and lines (zones), by the reinforcing of their engineer works, by the increased defensive fire power and by the broad use of mixed minefields.

The deep echeloning of the battle formations for the advancing units and formations, as practiced at the outset of the war, in breaking through the enemy focal defenses led to a weakening of the initial strike. Because of this, in the autumn of 1942, by the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No 306, single-echelon battle formations were introduced in the units and formations in order to ensure the simultaneous active involvement of all the personnel and weapons from the beginning to the end of combat.

During the second period of the war, with the increased depth of enemy defenses and the greater engineer organization and fire power, a single-echelon configuration of the advancing troops did not ensure the carrying out of the set missions. This necessitated a deeper echeloning of the battle formations. In the battalions, regiments, divisions and later in the corps as well, the battle formations on the offensive began to be formed up in two echelons and in three in the event of breaking through a previously prepared and deeply echeloned defense of the Nazi troops. The subunits, units and formations began to be assigned narrower zones (sections) of advance. For example, in the winter of 1941-1942 a rifle division ordinarily advanced in a zone 7-14 km wide, in the autumn of 1942 it was 4-5 km, in the summer of 1943 2-2.5 km and in 1944-1945, 1.5-2 km.⁸

Due to the fact that the number of tanks and assault guns constantly increased in the enemy defenses, for countering them in the divisions and corps artillery antitank reserves were established consisting of antitank artillery, SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and sometimes even tanks. In the course of the war, in the battle formations they also began to establish mobile obstacle building detachments consisting of engineer subunits with minelaying equipment. For the closer cooperation between the infantry, tanks and artillery, instead of artillery infantry support groups, they began organizing regimental, divisional and corps artillery groups. Forward detachments began to be widely employed in the formations. In certain instances a tank reserve was established in the divisions and corps.

On the defensive the need for the deep echeloning of the battle formations was caused by the increased striking power of the advancing enemy groupings as well as by the massed employment of tanks, artillery and aviation. During the first months of the war, the units and formations defended on a broad front with low densities of personnel and weapons. As a rule, their battle formations of a single echelon, and as a consequence of this the defense was shallow and easily overcome by the advancing enemy troops.

In the aim of creating a strong tactical defense, in the course of the war, the width of the defensive areas and sections was reduced for the units, subunits and formations while the depth of the defenses and the echeloning of the troops were increased. Even by the summer of 1943, in the tactical zone the Soviet troops began to create two defensive zones with a total depth of 15-20 km with the rifle divisions defending in zones of 6-14 km and corps 15-32 km. The battle formations of the units and formations were ordinarily organized in two echelons. Even before the subunits and units had begun creating antitank strongpoints for combating the tanks and the formations had organized antitank areas. As on the offensive, artillery antitank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments became new elements in the battle formation.

The trend toward increasing the elements of the troop battle configuration and the depth of their battle orders has continued to be apparent in the postwar period, too. The receiving of new weapons by the troops such as missile complexes, infantry combat vehicles, guided antitank missiles, combat helicopters, the significant increase in the number of tanks and the better combat properties of conventional weapons have brought about a further development of the troop battle formations. New elements have appeared in them and certain previous ones have changed qualitatively. According to foreign data, the battle formations have begun to include a first and second echelon or a combined-arms reserve, a missile unit (subunit), artillery groups, an air defense weapons grouping, antitank, engineer and other reserves as well as mobile obstacle construction detachments. In certain armies, the battle formations of the formations include forward and special detachments, tactical airborne forces and subunits of aeromobile troops for carrying out special missions.

Soviet military art during the years of the last war was enriched with new concepts and conclusions. Its basic principles underwent further development and practical embodiment, making it possible to successfully solve the most important problems of preparing and conducting armed combat.

In the course of the war, permanent trends were disclosed, showing: the intensified struggle for strategic initiative, the comprehensive use of all means for increasing the depth and degree of fire damage to the enemy, the development of the forms of armed combat, the increased scale and spatial scope of military operations, the concentrating of main efforts on the selected sectors and others. Certain of these trends continue to operate under present-day conditions as well. A profound knowledge of them is of great help to the commanders and staffs in developing modern military theory.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 7, p 513.
- ² KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 21, 1977, p 10.
- ³ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p 537.
- ⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1976, p 119.
- ⁵ Ibid., Vol 12, 1982, p 284.
- ⁶ "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1960, p 757.
- ⁷ "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], p 354.
- ⁸ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 7, p 630.

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AIR TACTICS: OPERATIONAL ART IN AIR COMBAT OVER THE KUBAN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 21-29

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen Avn L. Shishov: "Certain Questions of Air Force Operational Art in the Air Engagements Over the Kuban in 1943"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, air engagements arose in covering the ground forces, in repelling massed raids against major rear installations and in conducting independent air operations. The air engagements over the Kuban represented an aggregate of group air battles united by a common concept and conducted under the overall leadership simultaneously (successively) in the aim of defeating enemy aviation in the air or driving it from the battlefield.

The air engagements in the spring of 1943, the subject of this article, were a component part in the operations of the Northern Caucasus Front, where the task of winning operational air supremacy was carried out by two methods: by destroying enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air. The air engagements in carrying out this mission played the decisive role.

What can explain that in the spring of 1943, precisely over the Kuban, major air engagements were to occur? The problem was that the troops of the Northern Caucasus Front were undertaking offensive operations in the aim of liberating the Taman Peninsula and defeating the remnants of the Nazi Army Group A. At the same time, the enemy was endeavoring not only to keep the Taman Peninsula, but also to eliminate the beachhead in the area of Myskhako (Malaya Zemlya), with comparatively small forces (the troops of the 17th Army) to tie down the large field forces of the front and not allow them to move to the area of Kursk, where the Operation Citadel was being prepared.

Not having sufficient forces to hold the Taman Peninsula, the Nazi Command counted on checking the offensive being prepared by the Soviet troops using aviation. For this purpose up to 1,000 German aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet (around 38 percent of all its aviation operating at that time on the Soviet-German Front) were concentrated at the airfields of the Taman Peninsula and in the Crimea. Moreover, the enemy used up to 200 bombers stationed in the Donets Basin and in the south of the Ukraine for attacking our troops.

Bombers comprised the basis of the enemy air grouping. The fighter aviation which numbered 220 fighters consisted of the best, crack Udet and Molders squadrons as well as others manned with well-trained and experienced pilots. Certain fighter air subunits flew modernized FW-190 aircraft.

The Air Forces of the Northern Caucasus Front (commander, Lt Gen Avn K. A. Vershinin) consisted of the 4th and 5th Air Armies (commanders, Maj Gen Avn N. F. Naumenko and Lt Gen Avn S. K. Goryunov). Also involved in joint operations with them was a portion of the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet (the commander of the fleet air forces, Lt Gen Avn V. V. Yermachenkov) and the long-range aviation (commander, Lt Gen Avn N. S. Skripko). As a total there were around 600 aircraft.¹ Also based in the zone of the front were the air defense fighter air regiments which covered Krasnodar and the railroad between Tikhoretskaya and Armavir.

The decisive goals of the opposing sides on the ground, in causing the concentration of large masses of aviation for operations in a limited area, in essence also determined the nature of the struggle which developed in the air and which grew into major air engagements.

The first air engagement (17-24 April) occurred in the course of the fierce battles on the beachhead in the area of Myskhako. In the aim of eliminating this beachhead, the enemy had concentrated four infantry divisions. They were supported by 450 bombers and 200 fighters from the 4th Air Fleet. The Soviet Command used up to 500 combat aircraft for air support for the defending landing forces of the 18th Army.²

In this area of the front, the enemy aviation during the first days with a numerical superiority in forces also had an advantage in basing. Its fighter units were stationed 15-25 km from the frontline. But the Soviet fighters were forced to fly in from more distant airfields. The Nazi aviation temporarily seized operational supremacy in the air. On the land, the Nazis at a price of great losses succeeded in driving into the battle formations of our troops, but not significantly.

During these days, three air corps (the II Bomber, the II Combined and the III Fighter) and one separate fighter air division were quickly shifted from the reserve of Hq SHC to the Northern Caucasus Front. The balance of forces which had gone against the Soviet aviation was eliminated. It was now almost equal, however, in daytime bomber aviation the enemy had more than a 3-fold superiority and in fighter aviation was 2-fold inferior to us. With the approximately equal balance of forces, the crucial role was played by the combat-moral qualities of the flight personnel and by the organizational capacities of the command personnel. They were much higher among our flyers.

The representatives of Hq SHC, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov and the commander of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, Mar Avn A. A. Novikov, in being present at the Northern Caucasus Front, approved the plan for the air offensive by the front's air forces with the attached RGK [Reserve Hq SHC] air corps. The plan envisaged not only the providing of maximum support for the ground forces, but also the operational air supremacy.

In the course of the fierce group battles which developed in the air, the German bombers were caused tangible harm and the organized strikes against the battle formations of the holders of Malaya Zemlya were prevented. During 20 April alone, in 17 air battles the Soviet fighters shot down 50 German aircraft. Then in the following 3 days, the might of the strikes by Soviet aviation against the enemy increased. The activity of the enemy air forces declined: while from 17 through 20 April, each day 1,000-1,250 aircraft overflights were counted, in 21-22 April, their number had been halved and on 24 April dropped to 300. The first major air engagement which developed over the Kuban land on 17-24 April was won by Soviet aviation.

During this period the struggle for air supremacy in the Kuban was not limited to just air engagements and the partial neutralization of air defense. Soviet aviation widely destroyed enemy aircraft on the ground. At the end of April 1943, upon instructions of Hq SHC, an air operation was conducted to destroy enemy aviation at the airfields. This operation pursued the aim of maximally weakening the opposing enemy air grouping and winning supremacy in the air by the start of the front's offensive operation. This involved the 4th and 5th Air Armies of the Northern Caucasus Front, the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front, the 8th Air Army of the Southern Front, the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet and a long-range air group. According to the plan which had been approved by the representatives of Hq SHC, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov and Mar Avn A. A. Novikov, the plan was to destroy enemy aviation at 18 airfields where a large accumulation of aircraft had been discovered. The raids were made predominantly at night. The frontal [tactical] aviation and the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet operated against airfields located at a depth of 50-100 km, and the long-range aviation up to 300-350 km.³ As a result of this air operation, around 260 enemy aircraft were put out of operation.⁴

The second air engagement (29 April--10 May) developed over Krymskaya Station due to the fact that the troops of the Northwestern Front had resumed their offensive in the aim of defeating the Taman enemy grouping. The enemy resisted fiercely. Its aviation made massed bombing raids against the battle formations of the attackers and against the artillery firing positions. Our fighters opposed them.

The air operations of the 4th Air Army of the Northern Caucasus Front (commander, Gen K. A. Vershinin)⁵ developed according to a previously set plan. On 29 April, it made 1,308 aircraft sorties. The fighters, in the aim of supporting the attacks by the bombers and ground attack planes before the attack by the troops of the 56th Army, neutralized the enemy antiaircraft artillery and then began to drive enemy aviation from the battlefield, in going over to continuous patrolling in groups of 8-12 aircraft. The Soviet fighters immediately checked the Nazi aviation and seized the initiative, thereby protecting the ground troops against organized enemy air raids and ensuring freedom of actions for their aviation. On just 29 April, the enemy lost 74 aircraft in 50 air battles.⁶

In subsequent days, in the course of the offensive by the 56th Army, fierce group air battles (up to 40 daily) continued and in each of these 50-80 aircraft were involved from both sides. Out of the total number of combat sorties by the air army (9,580) from 29 April through 10 May, the fighters were responsible for 4,971 (52 percent) or 72 percent of all the daytime aircraft sorties.

Over these 12 days, the enemy lost 368 aircraft in the air. Soviet aviation had won the second air engagement and had also won operational supremacy in the air. The troops of the 56th Army broke the stubborn enemy resistance and on 4 May liberated Krymskaya Station, an important communications junction on the Taman Peninsula.

During the period of relative quiet (from 10 through 26 May), when the ground troops were fighting to improve their tactical position, in the 4th Air Army training was being carried out for the young pilots. Conferences were organized for the flight crews on studying and generalizing combat experience. One of the conferences was directed by Gen Ye. Ya. Savitskiy. Participating in its work were the famous fighter pilots A. I. Pokryshkin, V. D. Lavrinenkov, Amet-Khan Sultan, P. V. Bazanov and others.⁷ Use was also made of a form of training where the commanders of the air divisions and regiments traveled to the main guidance radio where they observed the air combat of the subordinate pilots and this made it possible to detect the positive and negative features of their combat training.

On 11 May, at Pashkovskaya Station, the commander of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, Mar Avn A. A. Novikov, held a meeting for the leadership of the formations and units in the 4th Air Army. A copy of his speech was sent out to all the air armies and along with the other materials on the operations of our aviation during the air engagements in the Kuban, was studied by all the leadership and flight personnel of the Air Forces.⁸

On 14 May 1943, the Air Forces commander issued a special directive which generalized the experience of the struggle for air supremacy.⁹ It pointed out that for destroying enemy aviation it was essential to assign fighter units which had good training in conducting air combat, particularly vertical air combat. It was also proposed that zones of air patrolling be created over enemy territory to a depth of 10-15 km. In the battle formations of the groups of patrolling fighters it was recommended that there be two subgroups: one for distracting the fighters and a second for destroying the bombers. It was emphasized that group air battles must be combined with attacks against enemy airfields (and these attacks should be powerful and a surprise) as well as with the neutralizing of the enemy ground air defense weapons. The directive played a major role in organizing the struggle for air supremacy in subsequent operations.

The third air engagement (26 May--7 June) occurred during a period when the troops of the Northern Caucasus Front were endeavoring to break through the enemy defenses in the regions of Kiyevskaya and Moldavanskaya Stations. The Nazi Command, having concentrated opposite them some 1,400 aircraft based at airfields in the Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and in the south of the Ukraine, had achieved a 1.5-fold supremacy in aviation.

On 26 May, in the aim of repelling the offensive by the Soviet troops, the enemy employed all the bomber aviation. This provided an opportunity for the enemy to make concentrated massed strikes in a narrow area of the front and these attacks ended with a star raid by 12 bomber groups numbering up to 600 aircraft. As a total during the day, German aviation made 1,169 aircraft sorties while on following ones there were up to 2,000 aircraft sorties per 24

An analysis of the data given in the table shows that the air engagements were stubborn and long (up to 2 months). The intensity of the air battle increased as the operations of the ground forces grew and in the third engagements, in comparison with the first, the Soviet fighters made almost 4-fold more aircraft sorties, the number of air battles rose by $4\frac{1}{2}$ times while enemy losses of aviation increased by more than 2-fold.

The results of the air engagements in the Kuban are impressive as the enemy lost 1,100 aircraft, including over 800 destroyed in air battles.¹⁰ The losses of flight personnel were particularly felt by the Nazi air force.

Without claiming to deal with all the questions concerning the operational art of the Air Forces in the air engagements over the Kuban, let us take up those which are, in our view, of greatest interest.

First of all, we should note that the basic efforts of aviation on the Northern Caucasus Front were focused successively: initially in the area of Myskhako, then on Krymskaya and finally Kiyevskaya and Moldavanskaya, that is, in the main sectors of ground forces operations. The major air engagements developed precisely there.

The commander of the Soviet Army Air Forces as well as the command of the front's Air Forces (the 4th Air Army), in planning combat operations in the aim of winning operational air superiority, drew on significant air forces including frontal, naval and long-range. Thus, during the period of the combat for the beachhead on Malaya Zemlya, of the 900 aircraft 370 were employed for destroying Nazi aviation in the air and 278 at the airfields.¹¹ In addition, a reserve was created of one fighter air regiment and this was based at Abinskaya Airfield (10 km from the front line) while up to a regiment of fighters was on alert at the basic airfields.¹² Fighter air units flying obsolete types of aircraft (I-16 and I-153) were employed for neutralizing the antiaircraft artillery.

Operational control over the combat operations of the air forces in the Kuban was initially concentrated in the hands of the air force commander of the Northern Caucasus Front, the command post of whom was near the command post of the front's commander (in the area of Abinskaya). In having contact with the commanders of the 4th and 5th Air Armies and with the command post of the air groups of the Black Sea Fleet Air Forces and the long-range aviation, the front's air force commander on a centralized basis directed the efforts of all aviation in accord with the overall plan of the front's commander and the course of combat operations. Subsequently, after the command and staff of the 5th Air Army were put at the disposal of the Steppe Front, the air force staff of the Northern Caucasus Front was abolished and aviation was controlled by the command and staff of the 4th Air Army.

In carrying out missions for air support for the combat operations of the ground troops on the Northern Caucasus Front and in attacking enemy airfields, the commander of the 4th Air Army controlled the group air battles and engagements from his command post. He assessed the air situation, he took decisions, he set missions for the commanders of the fighter air formations and organized cooperation between the types and branches of aviation and with the front's

hours and more. Each day there were about 50 air battles in which the enemy lost 50-60 aircraft but still temporarily won operational supremacy in the air. The troops which were approaching Kiyevskaya and Moldavanskaya Stations were exposed to strong enemy counterstrikes and in individual areas were forced to retreat.

In the aim of successfully countering the enemy aviation, the command of the Northern Caucasus Front adopted the necessary measures. The following were envisaged: fighters were to patrol at a depth of 5-10 km beyond the front line; a portion of the fighters was to be assigned for free hunting deep in enemy territory on the probable routes of flight of enemy aviation; enemy aircraft were to be intercepted at the distant approaches to the front line; the number of fighters escorting the bombers and ground attack planes was to be reduced and these were to be employed in repelling massed air raids; the fighters escorting the bombers and ground attack planes, in a favorable air situation, were to attack the enemy aircraft; for accelerating the calling in of fighters groups were to be constantly ready and these would know the sortie procedure and the sequence of operations in the air.

As a result of the adopted measures, the effectiveness of repelling the heavy raids by Nazi aviation increased immediately. By 7 June 1943, the number of aircraft overflights by enemy aviation declined to 300. The massed raids stopped. This was also aided by the attacks against airfields and these were done chiefly at night.

Thus, as a result of the air engagements, the attacks against airfields and the partial neutralization of the air defense weapons in the Kuban, operational air supremacy had been won. The overall results of the air engagements are shown in the table.

Table*

Results of Air Engagements in the Kuban

Air Engagements	Number of Aircraft Sorties by Soviet Fighters	Number of Air Battles	Losses	
			Enemy	Soviet Fighters
17-24 Apr 1943	1,427	85	152	76
29 Apr-10 May 1943	4,971	285	368	70
26 May-7 June 1943	5,601	364	315	150
Total	11,999	634	835	296

* The table has been compiled according to data of: TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 319, inv. 3736, file 3, sheet 61; inv. 4798, file 118, sheet 64; file 47, sheet 81; "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 229; "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], 162-170; "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1961, pp 392, 393.

antiaircraft artillery. Control and command were exercised personally, through the air army staff, as well as through an operations group which was located at the command post to the west of Abinskaya, 4 km from the forward edge, in the main sector of ground forces operations. The group had wire and radio communications with the air units. It was headed by one of the experienced commanders of the fighter air divisions. From this command post our fighters received information on the air situation in the area of the battlefield and the necessary orders and commands for conducting group air battles and for increasing the forces in combat. Their operations were also monitored.

The command post of the fighter aviation was located near the command post of the air defense chief of the 56th Army and this made it possible, in addition to receiving information on the air situation, to effectively coordinate fighter operations and the antiaircraft artillery.

For repelling enemy air raids, the entire territory of the front was broken up into zones for destroying enemy aircraft. Each fighter air division was assigned one such zone. The command posts of the units had a direct telephone link with the nearest air spotter posts and on the staffs of the air divisions special radios were installed for receiving information on the air enemy.

The operational configuration of the fighter aviation on an air-army scale consisted of the battle formations of the formations, units and subunits assigned for covering the troops, escorting the ground attack planes and bombers and neutralizing the ground air defense weapons as well as those assigned to the reserve for augmenting the effort in air battles.

In conducting air engagements, skillful use was made of the patrolling of fighter aviation in the air and alert duty at the airfields. Due to the fact that the enemy aviation was based closer to the front line, the patrolling of our fighters in the air was the main thing. This consumed an average of 50 percent of the total number of aircraft sorties by the fighters. During days of intense combat operations, the number of patrol sorties increased. Thus, on 27 May, 61 percent of all the fighter sorties were made for this purpose and on 29 May, 71 percent.

The operations section of the 4th Air Army staff, in proceeding from the actually developing air situation, worked out a schedule for covering the ground forces for each day. For each fighter air division, the composition of the groups and the time of their patrolling were established. The patrolling of the fighters in the air in covering the ground forces and in repelling massed enemy raids, in contrast to previous air engagements, was carried out by moving the patrolling zones beyond the frontline into enemy occupied territory and, in addition, by having an overflight by pairs and groups of fighters deep into enemy territory in the aim of promptly alerting the fighter air command post on the approach of enemy aircraft and for intercepting them at the distant approaches of the covered installations.

The experience of group air battles in the Kuban showed that success in them was inconceivable without a system of radio guidance and control from the ground making it possible to promptly augment the forces in combat, to aim them at the most vulnerable spots of the air enemy and help each group commander (leader) control the group air combat.

The augmenting of fighter forces in the group air battles was achieved employing both the reserves as well as by shifting fighters from other regions and zones.

The battle formations of the aircraft groups for varying tactical purposes ("clearing the air," attack, covering, feint, reserve and so forth) assigned from each fighter air group were echeloned in depth and altitude (the "Kuban ladder" ["etazherka"]).

In the course of the air engagements, for changing the balance of forces in aviation in the crucial sectors, the air formations were maneuvered. In 20-30 April, Hq SHC regrouped three air corps and one air division to the Kuban. This had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of the first air engagement. During the period of the air engagement in the region of Kiyevskaya and Moldavanskaya Stations, when the enemy aviation temporarily succeeded in seizing the initiative in the air, three fighter air divisions assigned for escorting bombers and ground attack planes on 27 May, by a decision of the 4th Air Army commander, were reassigned to provide an air cover for the troops of the front's assault grouping.

Out of the total range of questions relating to the support for air combat operations in the Kuban, we must note first of all the organizing of air defense for the 30 operating airfields of the 4th and 5th Air Armies. For covering them, 275 antiaircraft guns and 120 antiaircraft machine guns were assigned. One must also pay proper due to the operational camouflage and deception: "operating" very effectively, in distracting the enemy's attention, were 17 false airfields which had 110 dummy aircraft.

Great importance was given to the organizing of air reconnaissance. Up to 10 percent of the aircraft sorties were employed for conducting this. Reconnaissance disclosed not only the location of enemy airfields, but also the functioning of its air units.

Characteristic of the air engagements were highly intense combat operations of the fighters and for this reason at the airfields supplies (fuel and ammunition) were created for 10-12 days calculating four or five sorties per aircraft per 24 hours.

At the same time, an analysis of the air engagements over the Kuban indicates that there were also certain shortcomings in their organizing and implementation. For example, not enough use was made of adjacent air armies in the struggle for operational air supremacy. This would have deprived the enemy of an opportunity to maneuver its air forces and make massed strikes against the advancing troops of the Northern Caucasus Front. In the plans for combat operations, the questions of repelling massed enemy strikes were not worked out with sufficient fullness. During the first days of the air engagements, the basic efforts of our fighter aviation were focused on destroying the fighters in the air and not the bombers.¹³ The formations of the National Air Defense Troops and the front's air forces (the 4th Air Army), in repelling the massed enemy strikes, operated in certain isolation from one another. During the second and third air engagements, attacks on airfields were of a sporadic and local nature. Enemy air defenses were poorly combated with too few resources being assigned for this.

Thus, the air engagements over the Kuban in terms of their scope, the number of involved aviation forces and destroyed enemy aircraft and Nazi losses in personnel were the largest of all the preceding ones. The questions of planning combat operations and organizing cooperation among the different branches, in maneuvering the air formations, in breaking up the battle formations of the air units into groups of varying tactical purpose and echeloning them in altitude and depth. In addition to destroying aircraft on the ground and in the air, the ground air defense weapons were also neutralized.

The air engagements over the Kuban were not only an important stage in developing the operational art and tactics of the air force, but also a rich school in combat mastery for the Soviet pilots, engineer-technical personnel and the aviation commanders.

In the spring of 1943, by making combined strikes on the ground and in the air, the air might of the enemy had been significantly sapped and this contributed to the winning of strategic air supremacy along the entire Soviet-German Front in the summer of 1943.

An analysis of the air engagements over the Kuban and the generalizing of experience from World War II confirm the conclusion that the effective combating of the enemy air force depends upon precise coordination of efforts by all the Armed Services and branches of troops. As for the fighter aviation, it held the crucial role in the air battles and engagements and the greatest success was achieved when its operations were of a surprise, energetic and offensive nature and when various methods of combat operations were skillfully employed with clear control and massed use of the fighter air units and formations.

FOOTNOTES

¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 319, inv. 4798, file 70, sheet 65.

² "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1976, p 106.

³ I. V. Timokhovich, "Operativnoye iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operational Art of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1976, p 75.

⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," Vol 6, p 107.

⁵ The headquarters of the 5th Air Army left for Kursk, having turned over its units and formations to the 4th Air Army.

⁶ "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1968, p 164.

⁷ TsAMO, folio 346, inv. 5760, file 33, sheet 304.

- ⁸ TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 11250, file 88, sheets 17-42.
- ⁹ Ibid., folio 290, inv. 4205, file 24, sheets 438, 439.
- ¹⁰ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 299.
- ¹¹ TsAMO, folio 224, inv. 21836, file 5, sheets 105-107.
- ¹² Ibid., folio 35, inv. 30811, file 56, sheets 175-176.
- ¹³ "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye...", p 172.

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LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR PARTISANS IN BELORUSSIA

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 30-34

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Col B. Dolgotovich: "On Logistic Support for the Belorussian Partisan Formations"]

[Text] The partisan formations, like the Soviet Army formations, required continuous logistic support. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, this was carried out from three basic sources: local resources, supplies captured from the enemy as well as through centralized supply from the rear sources of the armies, fronts and the Center.

In the initial period of the war, only in certain Belorussian oblasts (Gomel, Polesye, Mogilev and Vitebsk) did the party and soviet bodies, in accord with the Directive of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 29 June 1941, succeed in creating depots with material supplies and weapons in the assumed areas of the partisan detachments. The depots were established secretly deep on the forested areas. A strictly limited number of party and soviet leaders knew of their existence and these same persons were to be entrusted with the leadership of the partisan movement in the enemy rear. Certain supplies of food, clothing, weapons and ammunition were concentrated at these depots. At first they were the basic source of logistic support for the partisan detachments and the underground which were being established.

The depots, as events were to show, played a role only during the initial period of the operations of partisan detachments. With the growth of the movement, the supplies stored at the depots were quickly depleted and it became evermore complex to supply the partisans with food, clothing, footwear and other essential things. For this reason, during the first months of the struggle in the enemy rear, the representatives of the Belorussian party and soviet bodies who were fighting in the underground or as part of the partisan formations initiated extensive explanatory and organizational work among the local population and the partisans to mobilize the local resources for logistic support for the partisan formations.

During the first months of the war, when the German occupiers in many remote regions of Belorussia had still not succeeded in plundering the property of the former kolkhozes, the partisans were supplied with food from their available

supplies. However, the occupation regime and repression were intensified by the Nazi invaders, the given method of procuring food gradually disappeared.

From the spring of 1942, in the partisan areas and zones of Belorussia, the party and soviet bodies began to carry out organized food procurement (by deliveries from the local population). The procedure and the standards for delivering agricultural products were set by the underground soviet and party bodies in the various oblasts of the republic depending upon the local conditions. Here the volume of deliveries was minimal and the principle of voluntariness was firmly observed.¹

For example, the following data show how extensive was the scale of supplying the partisans from the local resources. The Yelsk Partisan Brigade of Polesye Oblast in 1943 received from six rural soviets (Zasintsevskiy, Kormyanskiy, Kochishchenskiy, Mokhnovichskiy, Skorodnyanskiy and Staro-Vysotskiy) some 4,000 poods of grain, 7,000 poods of potatoes and 2,500 poods of meat.² Wherever possible, the flour mills and bakehouses were rebuilt and these were used to satisfy the needs of the partisan detachments.

The local resources were the basic but not the only source of food supply. In conducting active combat operations against the Nazi occupiers, the partisans in battle often captured food, fodder and clothing from the enemy. The captured goods also went to replenish the material supplies. In addition, the partisans systematically confiscated livestock, grain and fodder from the traitors of the motherland, the police as well as from the newly appeared Nazi landowners.

The problem of supplying clothing and footwear was a very acute one. During the entire war the needs of the partisans for this type of supplies was basically satisfied from local resources and captured supplies. A certain portion of clothing was also received from the unoccupied territory.

The Belorussian population literally from the first days of the war helped the people's avengers [the partisans] with clothing and footwear, particularly in the winter. The kolkhoz members, as much as possible, supplied the partisans with sheepskin coats and felt boots, they supplied sheepskins and leather and knitted woolen mittens, socks and scarfs. The 1st Drissen Brigade of Vitebsk Oblast, for example, received from the population 306 pairs of woolen gloves, 164 pairs of stockings, warm shirts and other winter clothing while the Donukalov Brigade received 420 gifts including greatcoats, felt boots and other warm articles.³ For certain partisan detachments, the basic source for obtaining clothing and particularly footwear was captured supplies.

In a report at the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party (the end of February 1943), P. K. Ponomarenko pointed out: "The partisan detachments are receiving clothing and food from both captured supplies as well as from the local population which willingly helps the partisans."⁴

The broad scope of the partisan movement in Belorussia confronted the party bodies and the command of the partisan detachments with the urgent question of supplying weapons and ammunition for the patriots who had set out to fight the Nazi invaders.

Due to the organizational and political indoctrination work of the republic communists and Komsomol members, the weapons and ammunition remaining in the areas of combat operations were collected and issued to the partisan formations. The kolkhoz members of Slutskiy Rayon in Minsk Oblast, for example, in 1941 collected weapons on the battlefield and turned over to the Partisan Brigade imeni Chkalov alone some 200 rifles, 14 machine guns and 20,000 cartridges. The anti-Nazi group in the village of Podzaluki in Zabludovskiy Rayon of Belostok Oblast turned over to the partisans some 8 rifles, 5 submachine guns, 50 grenades and 11 boxes of cartridges.⁵

The Komsomol members and youth participated widely in the collecting of weapons. The former first secretary of the Ruzhanskiy Underground Komsomol Committee, Ye. I. Gordey, subsequently recalled: "On 27 June 1941, Ruzhanskiy Rayon of Brest Oblast was occupied by Nazi troops. The collecting of weapons became the first joint cause for our Komsomol members. More than 200 rifles and automatics, 12 machine guns and much ammunition was picked up and hidden."⁶

The partisan detachments also organized the collecting of weapons and military equipment on the sites of former battles. A network of repair shops was set up for Soviet and captured weapons. Thus, the command of the Partisan Detachment imeni Kurmelev from the 1st Belorussian Partisan Brigade in Vitebsk Oblast set up a special group for the collecting and repairing of weapons. As a total the detachment collected and repaired 2 tanks, 4 guns, 6 mortars, 3 medium machine guns and 8 submachine guns and more than 80 rifles.⁷

The searching for and collection of weapons were carried out over the entire Belorussian territory not only in 1941, but also in the spring and summer of 1942. The partisans had a special need for explosives. There was not enough tolit for sabotage. Boldness and inventiveness helped. Tolit began to be removed from the collected bombs, shells and mortar shells. The local population aided actively in this. The inhabitant of the village of Staraya Dubrova in Polesye Oblast, the 73-year-old Karp Tolkachev removed the tolit from 24 bombs and turned this over to the partisans. The kolkhoz member Trofim Filippenya from the village of Solon transported 9 bombs to a partisan detachment for removing the tolit and Timofey Bulyga transported 6.⁸ Such a method of obtaining tolit, regardless of the rather primitive methods, to a certain degree covered the need for the explosive.

A significant portion of the weapons and ammunition was taken from the enemy as a result of successfully conducted combat operations. The capturing of equipment was the second basic source for acquiring weapons and ammunition particularly as in a number of instances the detachments could more easily secure ammunition from the enemy. The partisans in the Mogilev area, for example, in 1942 alone captured 8 guns, 195 medium and light machine guns, 155 automatics, 2,659 rifles, 199 pistols, 442,000 cartridges and 1,256 grenades.⁹ The 8th Partisan Brigade from the formation of S. G. Zhunin on 28 August 1942 defeated an enemy garrison at Slavnoye Station and captured a train with weapons and ammunition.¹⁰ The captured weapons and ammunition went to supply all the brigades of the formation.

Centralized supply of the Belorussian partisans (from the Soviet rear) with weapons, ammunition, explosives, medicines and sometimes clothing and food

started on a planned basis with an ever-increasing scale after the setting up of the Central Staff of the partisan movement [TsShPD] (30 May 1942) and the Belorussian staff [BShPD] (9 September 1942).

However, due to the growth of the partisan movement, as before there were not enough weapons and ammunition. The 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party held on 28 February 1943 drew the attention of the commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments to the need to acquire ammunition and weapons chiefly captured from the enemy in attacking trains and dumps and as a result of raids on garrisons and so forth.¹¹

From the spring of 1943, the nonoccupied territory began the mass dropping of combat cargo to the Belorussian partisans. The chief of the BShPD, P. Z. Kalinin on 1 June 1943 reported to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Mar Avn A. A. Novikov, that according to the plan of 16 April 1943, the air groups had delivered to the Belorussian partisans some 282 tons of ammunition and weapons, including 164 tons by the aviation of the airborne troops, 55 tons by the Civil Air Fleet and 37 tons by the long-range aviation.¹² Because of such material support, the Belorussian partisans significantly increased their activities. According to far from complete data just from April through May 1943, that is, on the eve of the Kursk Battle, they derailed 250 enemy trains, they killed 12,000 Nazis and traitors of the motherland, they blew up and destroyed 87 bridges on railroads and highways, they defeated 12 enemy garrisons and captured 35 depots and dumps.¹³

In the course of preparing and carrying out the "Rail War" the Belorussian partisans needed a great deal of explosives. The unoccupied homeland was unable to fully satisfy the requests for its delivery. For this reason, the partisans organized the making of tolit in permanent and mobile repair shops which existed in virtually each brigade and detachment. The shops usually manufactured and repaired firearms and removed tolit from shells and bombs. The inventiveness of the partisans was apparent in everything. In the Minsk partisan formation the engineer T. Ye. Shavgulidze made four types of grenades which demonstrated good results in combat. He also proposed a hand-held grenade launcher which was widely employed in many partisan brigades and detachments of the Minsk area.

The engineer-technical section of the BShPD was concerned with studying and generalizing the experience of employing the new types of equipment in the partisan formations. This section maintained a close contact in Moscow with many scientific research institutions which were developing new, more advanced types of weapons for the people's avengers. For example, several types of mines were designed specially for the partisans. Upon instructions of the TsShPD, a special demolition slab was manufactured weighing just 75 grams instead of 400 grams.¹⁴

The Belorussian partisans in 1944 received significant help in materiel from all the fronts participating in the liberation of the republic. The operations groups (agencies) of the BShPD under the military councils of the fronts were concerned with the questions of supplying combat cargo to the partisan formations.

During the Great Patriotic War, the BShPD and its operations groups at the fronts sent to the partisans: 41,776 rifles and carbines, 18,684 automatics, 7,124 pistols of various types, 2,674 machine guns, 1,348 mortars, 1,383 anti-tank rifles, 30,621,474 pistol and revolver cartridges, 43,628,491 rifle cartridges, 552,953 kg of tolit, 101,570 sabotage devices as well as a large amount of Bickford fuze, blasting caps and other military equipment.¹⁵ In addition, the Belorussian partisans received great help directly from the troop field forces and formations, particularly from the autumn of 1943, when the Soviet troops entered the republic and direct contact and cooperation were established between the Soviet Army units and the partisans. For example, the command of the 61st Army from October 1943 through June 1944 turned over to the Polesye and Pinsk partisan formations: 225 automatics, 91 medium and light machine guns, 648 rifles, 11 mortars, 12 antitank rifles, 20 pistols and revolvers, 1,100 grenades, 2,400 kg of explosive and around 3.7 million rifle and automatic cartridges.¹⁶ Just the partisan brigade under the command of M. I. Gerasimov (the Pinsk formation) in 1944 received 120,000 rifle cartridges and 50,000 automatic cartridges from the Soviet Army.¹⁷

The combat cargo for the Belorussian partisans was delivered chiefly by air. Air was not only the basic type of transport for delivering cargo, but also a means of direct and immediate contact for the partisans with the nation's rear. As a total over the 3 years of the war (from July 1941 through July 1944), military and civilian aircraft transported 2,400 tons of military cargo to the Belorussian partisans.¹⁸

The aid for the Belorussian partisans from the unoccupied territory helped to increase the effectiveness of their strikes against the enemy and made it possible to cause more tangible losses for the Nazis in personnel and equipment and thereby to provide effective aid to the Soviet Army in defeating the Nazi invaders.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Partiya vo glave narodnoy bor'by v tylu vraga 1941-1944 gg." [The Party at the Head of the People's Struggle in the Enemy Rear. 1941-1944], Moscow, Mysl', 1976, p 262.

² A. I. Zaleskiy, "Geroicheskiy podvig millionov v tylu vraga" [The Heroic Feat of Millions in the Enemy Rear], Minsk, Belorus', 1970, p 44.

³ "Partiya vo glave...", p 264.

⁴ PA IIP pri TsK KPB [Party Archives of the Institute of Party History Under the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party], folio 4, inv. 20, file 214, sheet 31.

⁵ "Nepokorennaya Belorussiya" [Unconquered Belorussia], Voenizdat, 1963, pp 23, 301.

⁶ ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, 7 September 1979.

- ⁷ "Vsenarodnoye partizanskoye dvizheniye v Belorussii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (iyun' 1941--iyul' 1944)" [The All-People's Partisan Movement in Belorussia During the Years of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941--June 1944)], Documents and Materials, Vol 1, Minsk, Belorus', 1967, p 628.
- ⁸ A. I. Zalesskiy, op. cit., pp 77, 78.
- ⁹ "Napokorennaya Belorussiya," p 106.
- ¹⁰ S. G. Zhunin, "Ot Dnepra do Buga" [From the Dnepr to the Bug], Minsk, Belarus', 1974, pp 71-73.
- ¹¹ "Vsenarodnoye partizanskoye dvizheniye...", Vol 2, 1973, p 186.
- ¹² Ibid., p 418.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ PA IIP pri TsK KPB, folio 3500, inv. 3, file 92, sheets 34, 36, 38; N. Yakubovskiy, "Omoshch' sovetskogo tyla partizanam" [The Aid of the Soviet Rear to the Partisans], Minsk, Belarus', 1973, p 149.
- ¹⁵ N. Yakubovskiy, op. cit., p 183.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., pp 155-156.
- ¹⁷ PA IIP pri TsK KPB, folio 3500, inv. 4, file 283, sheet 261.
- ¹⁸ P. P. Lipilo, "KPB organizator i rukovoditel' partizanskogo dvizheniya v Belorussii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [The Belorussian Communist Party, the Organizer and Leader of the Partisan Movement in Belorussia During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], Minsk, Gosizdat BSSR, 1959, p 170.

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48th GUARDS RIFLE DIVISION IN DEFENSIVE BATTLE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 35-39

[Article by Col (Ret) N. Gladkov: "The Defensive Battles of the 48th Guards Rifle Division to the Southwest of Kharkov in March 1943"]

[Text] At the end of February 1943, the Nazi Command, in continuing the counteroffensive commenced on the southwestern sector, regrouped its forces and on 4 March resumed the offensive of its troops. The enemy was endeavoring to break through to Kharkov from the south. In the course of stubborn defensive battles against superior enemy forces the men and commanders of the 48th Guards Rifle Division fought heroically along with the troops of the 25th Guards Rifle Division and the Separate Czechoslovak Battalion.¹

In carrying out the instructions of the front's commander, on 28 February the commander of the 3d Tank Army, Col Gen Tank Trps P. S. Rybalko took the decision to dig in with the forces of the 160th, 350th and 48th Guards Rifle Divisions on the line of Ocheretovo, Kamyshevatoye, Staroverovka (East), Berestovaya and Dmitriyevka and to prevent the enemy tanks and infantry from breaking through to Kharkov from the southwest and the south.² The 48th Guards Rifle Division received the mission of going over to the defensive on the front of Kamsyshevatoye, Vlasovka Station some 20 km long. It was ordered to immediately begin the engineer organization of the terrain. The first stage of work had to be completed by the end of 1 March. Here it was essential to ready all road junctions and population points for all-round defense.³ By 1200 hours, the division took up the defensive along the line indicated for it (see the diagram). [Following page]

The division's commander, Maj Gen N. I. Makovchuk, decided that the battle formation would be in a single echelon with the 138th Guards Rifle Regiment on the right flank, the 143d in the center and the 146th on the left flank. These units were commanded, respectively, by Maj P. S. Gorelov, Lt Col F. P. Yershov and Maj I. A. Sobko. A training battalion located in the village of Stanichnoye was assigned to the reserve. There also were the antitank artillery reserve (10 45-mm guns of the 53d Guards oipdn [separate antitank battalion]) and a mobile obstacle construction detachment (a combat engineer company with 300 antitank mines). Due to the shortage of artillery, artillery groups were not organized. For firing from covered firing positions there was a battalion of 122-mm howitzers from the 98th Artillery Regiment which was located to the north of Mokryanka.



Combat Operations of 48th Guards Rifle Division at Kharkov,
4-5 March 1943

First of all it was essential to organize antitank defenses. For this anti-tank strongpoints consisting of 10-14 guns and a PTR [antitank rifle] platoon in each were organized from the battalion and regimental artillery and the cannon battalions from the artillery regiment in Kamyshevatoye, Mokryanka and at Vlasovka Station.⁴ The fire of artillery and mortars comprised the basis of the fire plan and this was supplemented by PTR and machine gun fire. A zone of solid small arms and machine gun fire was created ahead of the forward edge of the battalion defensive areas. The intervals between them were fired on by gun, PTR and machine gun fire. In the population points, all the stone buildings were equipped as permanent firing emplacements. For 2 days, the division's units equipped the occupied positions in engineer terms. On tank approaches as well as on the boundary with the adjacent 160th Rifle Division responsibility for which was held by the commander of the 48th Guards Rifle Division, regimental and divisional combat engineers in individual areas set out antitank minefields and landmines.

Continuous reconnaissance of the enemy was carried out. Already on 1 March, the command and staff learned about the concentration of enemy tanks, armored personnel carriers, motor vehicles and personnel in the region of Klenovka, Yarotivka and Staroverovka and were able to take the appropriate measures.

As a whole, regardless of the significant shortage of personnel and weapons, in a short period of time it was possible to organize a sufficiently strong defense. The division's units were brought to full combat readiness.

Party political work was carried out actively. The personnel was explained the importance of firmly holding on to the occupied positions to check the enemy drive against Kharkov. Great attention was given to indoctrinating tenacity

on the defensive and to showing the feats of the soldiers and commanders who had particularly distinguished themselves in previous battles.

The enemy commenced reconnaissance in force on 3 March. By 1500 hours, scores of bombers had made a massed strike on the division's battle formations. These were greeted with solid fire from the guns of the antiaircraft artillery battery. The men of the rifle subunits conducted volley fire against the diving aircraft using their rifles, machine guns and PTR. In a short period of time three J-88 bombers were shot down.

Two hours after a second enemy air raid, more than 70 tanks and up to two regiments of motorized infantry on armored personnel carriers began advancing against the battle formations of the guardsmen. The SS Tank Division "Adolf Hitler" was on the move. The enemy operated in two groups along two axes: to the southeast of Kamyshevatoye and toward the railroad station of Vlasovka. The subunits of the 138th and 146th Guards Rifle Regiments greeted the enemy with organized and heavy fire from all types of weapons. A howitzer battalion opened up concentrated fire at the largest grouping of tanks and BTR [armored personnel carrier] advancing on Kamyshevatoye. The artillery troops and the antitank gunners of the PTOP [antitank strongpoint], in boldly allowing the Nazi vehicles to come close, opened up surprise deadly fire against them. Thus, the artillery gunners from the battery of Lt Sukhoryabov in 2 hours of fierce battle on the southeastern edge of Kamyshevatoye by accurate fire from a range of 150-200 m hit two tanks, one assault gun, two armored personnel carriers and destroyed four machine guns with crews.⁵ Here also the antitank gunners distinguished themselves. Pvts Kuleshov and Fedorov, having opened fire from the PTR from a range of 50-60 m, hit two enemy tanks. On the division's left flank, Pvts Golovin and Budya, antitank gunners from the 146th Guards Rifle Regiment, hit two tanks, one armored personnel carrier and two motor vehicles.

Until late at night, the courageous guardsmen from the 48th Division drove off one after another of the enemy's rabid attacks. The enemy succeeded in pushing back the thinned subunits of the 138th and 143d Guards Rifle Regiments and capture the southeastern part of Kamyshevatoye and the southern edge of Mokryanka while on the division's left flank the Nazis had driven into the defenses of the 146th Guards Regiment to the east of Vlasovka Station.

An impenetrable darkness descended on the ground, however work continued in the regiments all night. The damaged foxholes, slit trenches and other works were rebuilt. The combat engineers scattered mines ahead of the antitank areas and the firing positions of the howitzer battalion.

The enemy was also not sleeping. In its positions before dawn the roar of tank and motor vehicle engines could be heard. The Nazis were regrouping their forces. In order to ascertain where the enemy was concentrating its basic grouping, the divisional staff and the regimental staffs organized a reconnaissance. A reconnaissance group from the 143d Guards Rifle Regiment, headed by Sr Lt Gerasimov attacked a house in the southern part of Mokryanka where there were up to 20 SS troops. Some 12 soldiers were killed and the others fled. The captured documents made it possible to ascertain that opposite the

regiment's left front was a tank regiment from the SS Tank Division "Adolf Hitler" which prior to this had been advancing in the sector of the 138th Guards Rifle Regiment. The division's commander ordered that the defenses be strengthened on the border of the 143d and 146th Regiments.

On the morning of 4 March, battle resumed with new strength. At 0800 hours, after a 20-minute air softening-up, the enemy resumed the offensive. It concentrated its main effort on the division's left flank: against the subunits of the 146th Guards Rifle Regiment, it threw around 50 tanks and assault guns and up to a regiment of motorized infantry on armored personnel carriers.⁶

Simultaneously, 30-40 tanks and up to a battalion of motorized infantry were advancing around Kamyshevatoye to the northwest. The subunits of the 138th Guards Rifle Regiment, in cooperation with the batteries of 76-mm cannons from the 1st Battalion of the 98th Guards Artillery Regiment, during the day drove off around 10 attacks by the Nazis who were striking from the southeast and the northeast. In the second half of the day the enemy succeeded in encircling two battalions of the 138th Regiment in the southeastern part of Kamyshevatoye. Here the regiment's commander organized an all-round defense. Up to the end of the day the courageous guardsmen repelled the continuous Nazi attacks and at the same time were preparing a strike in the aim of breaking out of the encirclement. The direction of the attack was set, the assault group and the cover group were established and the cooperation and target designation signals were verified. At 2300 hours of 4 March, the courageous soldiers with a surprise attack broke through the ring of encirclement and reached the northern edge of Vinniki where they were given the mission of advancing toward Stanichnoye and Star. Vodolaga. In this heavy battle, particularly distinguishing themselves were the men from the crew of the 76-mm gun under the command of Sgt Frolenko as well as the gunner from another 76-mm gun, Pfc Chernykh. In supporting the breakout of the subunit, at those instants when the terrain was illuminated by rockets, firing literally at point-blank range, they hit two German tanks and two armored personnel carriers.

At this same time, in the area of the southern edge of Mokryanka the subunits of the 143d Regiment were fighting the enemy tanks and infantry. Later, together with a howitzer battalion they supported the disengagement of the main forces of the 138th and 146th Guards Rifle Regiments, for more than 3 hours they held up the Nazi drive and covered the road to Vinniki.⁷ Seemingly, there was no limit to the courage and tenacity of the soldiers.

...In the area of the 146th Guards Rifle Regiment in the area defended by the 2d Battalion, a fierce battle broke out. In covering the withdrawal of the regiment's main forces from the northeastern edge of Vlasovka Station, the battalion perished completely, but did not let the Nazi infantry pass.⁸ In a fierce engagement, the regiment's commander Maj Ivan Anufriyevich Sobko perished. The guardsmen carried his body from the battlefield. Later on he was buried at the Central Military Cemetery in Kharkov.

In developing the offensive from Staroverovka along a northwesterly axis, a portion of the forces from the enemy SS Tank Division was dashing toward the road junction of Stanichnoye in order to cut off the escape route for the 48th Division to the Mzha River. However, the Nazi tanks and motorized infantry

did not succeed in capturing the village without a halt. Here the enemy encountered the organized defenses from the division's reserve, the training battalion and the ATPR [artillery antitank reserve]. Having let the Nazi tanks approach to direct laying range, 10 antitank weapons upon the command of the battalion's commander, Maj A. I. Mitin, opened up precise fire against them. However, the Nazis continued to advance at a high speed. The head vehicles, in approaching the forward edge of the battalion's defensive zone, hit the minefield set by the combat engineers. Two "Tigers" exploded. The tanks rushed to find a bypass. Certain ones opened up heavy fire from a halt. The dismounted infantry moved forward under their cover. At this moment, the officer candidates from the division's training battalion entered battle. The riflemen, machine gunners and antitank gunners set up concentrated fire against the running enemy infantry and this fire was intensified by the fire of the antitank battalion. In the fire duel, particularly distinguishing itself was the platoon of the 45-mm gun under the command of Jr Lt I. D. Burlak. In an hour, the two cannons hit seven enemy tanks.

The artillery troops also suffered great losses. The gun crews were knocked out and one cannon was hit directly. In this difficult situation, the platoon's commander, Communist Ivan Burlak, did not lose his head. Having seen that four enemy tanks were rapidly approaching the firing position, he rushed up to the surviving gun and in a few minutes had been able to hit three of them with three accurate rounds. The fourth tank at a high speed broke into the firing position and crushed the platoon's last weapon. As soon as the enemy tank had begun to pull back from the crushed gun, I. D. Burlak who had succeeded in concealing himself in a slit trench, quickly emerged from his shelter and threw two antitank grenades at the departing tank. The Nazi vehicle, engulfed in flames, halted. The platoon commander was also severely wounded. For heroism shown in battle against the enemy tanks (from the two 45-mm guns the platoon had hit 11 tanks), Guards Jr Lt Ivan Danilovich Burlak was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, First Degree.

Twilight came and then night set in, but the battle still continued. The enemy succeeded in capturing Stanichnoye. However, the Nazis had lost 22 tanks which had been hit by the men of the training battalion and the 53d Guards oipdn. For skillful leadership of battle, the commander of the 53d Guards oipdn, Maj Aleksey Ivanovich Mitin, was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, Second Degree. Many officers and soldiers from the battalion received orders and medals.

With the loss of Stanichnoye, in essence, the battle was ended for the division's defensive zone which it had occupied from 1 March. Under the blows of superior enemy forces, the 48th Guards Rifle Division retreated to a line to the southwest of the edge of Sukhaya Balka, the western edge of Mokryanka, Mokra, the Comintern Sovkhoz and Prikhnevka. Under the cover of night, it was ordered to secretly pull back to the region of Mantsilovka, Minkovka, Kabzarevka, to take up the defensive there and to prevent the enemy from breaking through along a northerly axis.⁹

In the course of the stubborn 2-day defensive battles, the division's units caused the enemy significant losses and along with the army's other formations,

checked the advance by the enemy assault grouping against Kharkov from the south. During this time, the guardsmen hit and set afire 38 tanks, 12 armored personnel carriers, 45 motor vehicles and destroyed more than 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ On the involvement of the 25th Guards Rifle Division and the Separate Czechoslovak Battalion in the defensive battles on the Kharkov sector, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1963, pp 35-45.
- ² TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 3 TA, inv. 4487, file 136, sheet 165.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid., file 130, sheet 72.
- ⁵ Ibid., folio 901, inv. 295696, file 1, sheets 56, 57, 77-79.
- ⁶ Ibid., folio 3 TA, inv. 4487, file 131, sheet 101.
- ⁷ Ibid., folio 901, inv. 295696, file 1, sheet 77.
- ⁸ Ibid., inv. 480893, file 1, sheet 7.
- ⁹ Ibid., inv. 4487, file 52, sheets 141, 146.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4487, file 78, sheet 44; folio 901, inv. 480893, file 1, sheets 6, 7.

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BATTLE ORDERS RELATING TO KURSK AIR BATTLE PUBLISHED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 40-44

[Article by Col Ye. Simakov: "Soviet Aviation in the Battle of Kursk"]

[Text] In preparing the offensive at Kursk, the Nazi Command drew upon the 4th and 6th Air Armies numbering more than 2,000 aircraft for supporting the ground forces and for fighting our aviation.

In endeavoring to weaken the enemy air grouping as much as possible, Hq SHC in May and June 1943 organized two large air operations to destroy enemy aviation at the airfields. As a result of these, a total of around 750 enemy aircraft were destroyed. In the first and largest of them conducted from 6 through 8 May 1943, six air armies (1st, 15th, 16th, 2d, 17th and 8th) participated and these were part, respectively, of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern Fronts. On 4 May 1943, the directives of Headquarters were sent out to the military councils of these fronts (Document 1).

On 5 May, 24 hours before the start of the operation, the air armies participating in the operation received the Order of the Air Force Commander of the Soviet Army (Document 2).

The first massed raid (112 bombers, 156 ground attack planes and 166 fighters) was made against the enemy airfields in the morning of 6 May and the second during the day of 6 May and the third in the morning of 7 May.

Due to the fact that surprise was lost in the subsequent massed raids by our aviation, the commanders of the air armies were ordered to temporarily continue nighttime operations using only hunter forces (Document 3).

In the course of this operation, 25 enemy airfields were subjected to repeated raids and up to 1,300 different types of aircraft were based at them. As a total, 1,392 aircraft sorties were made (434 in the first raid, 777 in the second and third and 181 in the fourth). The enemy lost over 500 aircraft (Document 4).

One of the main tasks for aviation during the period of preparing for the defensive operation at Kursk was intensive air reconnaissance making it possible

to detect the locations for the build-up of enemy personnel and equipment (Document 5).

The involving of large masses of aviation, the centralized control of it and the increased skill of the crews made it possible to have massed use of the existing forces and ensure the most efficient air raids against the enemy. Thus, in the 16th Air Army during the period of the counteroffensive, each day three or four massed raids were made, each involving 350-400 aircraft. The raids were made in waves lasting 45-50 minutes (Document 6).

Due to the continuous raids by our aviation, to the employment of various methods of combat operations and to the heroism of the Soviet pilots (Document 7), the enemy suffered great losses in personnel and equipment.

As a result of the enormous losses which Nazi aviation suffered on the ground and in the air and due to the tangible losses in personnel, the fierce struggle for strategic air supremacy which lasted 2 years on the Soviet-German Front ended in the summer of 1943 in favor of the Soviet Air Forces.

Document 1

**From the Directive of Hq SHC to the Military Council of the
Voronezh Front of 4 May 1943¹**

Hq SHC has ordered, during the period from 6 through 16 May inclusively, that the forces of the 2d Air Army, the IV Fighter Air Corps, the I Ground Attack Air Corps and the I Bomber Air Corps carry out the following missions:

1. Destroy enemy aviation on the airfields and in the air in the region of Belopolye, Romny, Poltava, Nov. Vodolaga and Merefa.
2. To interdict enemy rail shipments from Poltava to Kharkov.
3. To interrupt motor traffic on the roads to the east of the line of Belopolye, Akhtyrka, Nov. Vodolaga.

The first raid against enemy airfields is to be made between 0430 hours and 0500 hours on 6 May. The enemy aviation is to be exposed to combat operations for 3 days, then there is to be a 2-day break and again 3 days of operations against the airfields.

Operations against railroads and motor transport on dirt and main roads should be systematic over the entire 10 days, and steam locomotives, tank cars, tank trucks, passenger cars and staff vehicles should be knocked out first with machine gun and cannon fire.

Detailed instructions on the procedure for carrying out the missions have been issued to the air army commander by the commander of the Red Army Air Forces....

Upon authorization of Hq SHC

Vasilevskiy

TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense],
folio 48, inv. 2, file 8, sheets 99-100 (original).

**From the Order of the Commander of the Red Army Air Force
to the Commander of the 2d Air Army of 5 May 1943²**

Pursuant of the order of Hq SHC, from 6 through 16 May 1943, inclusively, I set for you the following tasks:

...The basic mass of enemy aviation is to be neutralized on the very first day. For this reason, on this day the enemy airfields should be subjected to a second raid and during the night the night bombers should operate against them. On the following 2 days, without reducing the tenacity and pressure, to continue to hit enemy aviation both basically on the airfields as well as in the regions of your operations which have recently been detected by air reconnaissance....

A raid against the airfields is to be made by large groups, assigning from them the necessary number of aviation for neutralizing the enemy antiaircraft defenses....

Acting Commander of the Air Forces of the Red Army, Col Gen Avn Vorozheykin	Member of the Military Council of the Air Forces of the Red Army, Lt Gen Avn Shimanov
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TsAMO, folio 290, inv. 4205, file 24, sheet 96.

**From the Order of the Commander of the Red Army Air Forces
to the Commanders of the Air Armies of 8 May 1943**

As a consequence of the loss of the surprise of attack...the results of our massed raids against airfields, troop trains and other shipments on 7 May 1943 have declined sharply in comparison with the results achieved on 6 May 1943.

My orders are:

To make breaks of 3 or 4 days in the massed raids...going over during these days to broad operations against motor and rail shipments using "hunter" forces....

Nighttime operations...are to be continued without reducing the rate.

Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Forces, Col Gen Avn Vorozheykin	Member of Military Council of Red Army Air Forces, Lt Gen Avn Shimanov
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TsAMO SSSR, folio 290, inv. 4205, file 24, sheet 199.

**From Information on Losses Suffered by Enemy in Raids
Against Enemy Airfields on 6, 7, 8 May 1943**

Name of Fronts and Air Armies [AA]	Enemy Losses					Note
	a	b	c	d	e	
Western Front, 1st AA	129	18	10	--	157	Six airfields hit with up to 280 aircraft
Bryansk Front, 15th AA	39	--	--	--	39	Airfield in area of Orel hit with up to 80 aircraft
Central Front, 16th AA	70	--	24	2	96	Five airfields hit with up to 220 air- craft
Voronezh Front, 2d AA	79	21	18	6	124	Eight airfields hit with up to 260 air- craft
Southwestern Front, 17th AA	21	12	12	--	45	Two airfields hit with up to 270 aircraft
Southern Front, 8th AA	35	--	3	2	40	Three airfields hit with up to 180 air- craft
Total for all fronts:	373	51	67	10	501	

Key: a--Destroyed at airfield
b--Damaged at airfield
c--Shot down in air combat
d--Hit in air combat
e--Total

Deputy Commander of Red Army Air Forces, Col Gen Avn Nikitin
Member of Military Council of Red Army Air Forces, Lt Gen Avn Shimanov
Acting Chief of Staff of the Red Army Air Forces, Lt Gen Avn Korolenko

TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 266133, file 1, sheets 68-69.

**Report of Commander of Red Army Air Forces of 14 May 1943
to Hq SHC on Enemy Troop Build-Up Discovered by Air Reconnaissance
in the Region of Orel, Kromy for Offensive**

To Comrade Stalin
To Comrade Vasilevskiy

My report is:

Aerial photographic reconnaissance by the 4th Reconnaissance Air Regiment by the end of 14 May 1943 in the region of Orel, Kromy established over 900 enemy tanks and up to 1,500 motor vehicles.

The tanks are located 5-10 km behind the front line at the following points: 150 tanks and vehicles 2 km to the west of Kurakino Station (50 km to the southeast of Orel); 200 tanks and 100 vehicles to the south of Krasnaya Ivanovka (8 km to the west of Kurakino Station); 200 tanks and motor vehicles in the forest to the north of Sobakino (23 km to the southwest of Kurakino Station); 220 tanks and vehicles in a grove to the south of Staroye Gorokhovo; 90 tanks and 30 vehicles near Rogovka (50 km to the south of Orel).

In the villages adjacent to Zmiyevka Station (35 km to the southeast of Orel), a significant number of motor vehicles and 50-60 tanks were noted. At Zmiyevka Station, 12 trains have unloaded with motor vehicles and freight; the station is covered by the fire of three antiaircraft artillery batteries.

The tanks located outside of population points and woods have been partially dug in and camouflaged. Moreover, systematic air observation over the last 3 days at the 16 airfields in the Orel region has noted more than 580 enemy aircraft.

I conclude that the enemy with the tank and motorized units has taken up a jump-off position and has created an air grouping in the Orel sector for assisting the ground forces.

Commander of the Red Army Air Forces, Mar Avn Novikov

14 March 1943

TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 92865, file 59, sheets 22-23.

**From the Battle Order of the Staff of the 16th Air Army
of 14 July 1943**

1. The enemy, in suffering great losses in the 7-day battles against the troops of the Central Front, has gone over to the defensive....

Its air forces, because of the offensive by the other front, have significantly reduced their activities on the Central Front, in conducting reconnaissance by individual aircraft and sporadic patrolling over its troops in groups of two-four fighters.

2. The 16th Air Army by massed strikes using bomber and ground attack aviation is to assist the units of the Central Front in breaking through the enemy's defensive zone in the area of Protasovo and the railroad station of Ponyri. By anticipatory strikes against enemy personnel and equipment, it is to assist the advancing units and to prevent the enemy bombing of the battle formations of our ground forces.

3. The III Bomber Air Corps, the VI Mixed Air Corps, the 2d Guards Ground Attack Air Division and the 299th Ground Attack Air Division, with a direct escort by fighters from the VI Mixed Air Corps, the VI Fighter Air Corps, the 283d and 286th Fighter Air Divisions, during the day in four successive waves are to make four massed raids against the enemy personnel and equipment according to the proposed schedule....

From the Schedule of the Massed Raid

No	Unit	a	b	Time of raid	Cover		
					Unit	a	b
				First Wave**			
1	241st Bomber Air Division of III Bomber Air Corps	4	18	From "h" to "h"+0.15	VI Fighter Air Corps	4	6
	2d Guards Ground Attack Air Division	5	8-10	From "h" to "h"+0.15	283d Fighter Air Division	5	4
2	301st Bomber Air Division of III	4	18	From "h"+0.15 to "h"+0.15	VI Fighter Air Corps	4	6
	299th Ground Attack Air Division	5	8-10	From "h"+0.15 to "h"+0.30	286th Fighter Air Division	5	4
3	221st Bomber Air Division of VI Mixed Air Corps	5	9	From "h"+0.30 to "h"+0.45	282d Fighter Air Division from VI Mixed Air Corps	5	6
	299th Ground Attack Air Division	4	8-10	From "h"+0.30 to "h"+0.45	286th Fighter Air Division	4	4

** Analogous planning was done for the second, third and fourth waves.

Key: a--Number of groups
b--Number of aircraft in groups

Commander 16th Air Army, Lt Gen Avn Rudenko
Chief of Staff of 16th Air Army, Maj Gen Avn Brayko

TsAMO, folio 368, inv. 21854, file 2, sheets 64, 65, 66, 67.

**From the Political Report to the Chief of the Political
Directorate of the Voronezh Front of 9 July 1943**

During 7-8 July, the units conducted combat to destroy enemy personnel and equipment and to cover our troops....

In carrying out combat missions, the ground attack plane and fighter pilots have shown exceptional courage and valor, decisiveness and tenacity, both in attacking ground targets and in encountering Nazi air vultures.

In each unit there is a large number of combat feats and examples of heroism in fighting the enemy.

The pilots of the 203d Fighter Air Division, in carrying out a combat mission to cover the ground attack planes on 7 July, in air battles shot down 24 enemy aircraft and hit 2, while the pilots of the regiment of Maj Mochalin and the deputy commander for political affairs, Capt Kravchenko shot down 12 enemy aircraft and hit 2.

The squadron commander of the 516th Fighter Air Regiment, Jr Lt Tokarenko and member of the Communist Party, in escorting ground attack planes in the target area, showed exceptional heroism, in engaging 12 FW-190 with his wingman. In this battle he shot down 2 enemy aircraft and when Comrade Tokarenko had used up all his ammunition, he made false attacks, driving the enemy aircraft away from the ground attack planes. The ground attack planes carried out the assignment without losses....

There are numerous instances when the ground attack planes not only destroy enemy personnel and equipment, but also engage enemy fighters.

A group of IL-2 airplanes over the target was attacked by 4 ME-109 and 2 FW-190. Having carried out the assignment, the ground attack planes, regardless of the enemy's clear superiority, engaged it in battle. A courageous Komsomol member, a pilot from the 61st Fighter Air Regiment, Lt Lebedkin, in this battle proved himself to be a true patriot of our motherland. Regardless of the wounds sustained in the leg, back and head, he courageously fought the Nazi air vultures and shot down an enemy aircraft....

Chief of Political Section of the 2d Air Army, Col Asaulenko

TsAMO, folio 302, inv. 4207, file 31, sheets 124-126.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Analogous directives were sent to the commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Southwestern and Southern Fronts.

² Similar orders were sent to the commanders of the 1st, 8th, 15th, 16th and 17th Air Armies.

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ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTY IN STRENGTHENING COOPERATION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 50-57

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col P. Skorodenko: "The Increased Role of the Communist Parties in Strengthening the Combat Association of Fraternal Armies"]

[Text] In the historic clash between the two systems, in recent years there has been a marked turn toward confrontation. The aggressive forces of imperialism have conducted a fierce offensive against a lessening of international tension and have sought military superiority over the socialist countries. The arms race which has been increased by the United States and certain of its allies in the aggressive NATO bloc is moving into a qualitatively new, more dangerous stage for mankind.

The socialist policy of peace opposes the imperialist policy of increasing international tension. Collective defense is an important area of this. Life confirms the correctness of Lenin's instructions that the nations which have set out on the socialist path of development "without fail need a close military and economic union, otherwise the capitalists...will stifle and suffocate us one by one." The socialist commonwealth states are loyal to the legacy of the world proletariat's leader.¹ They have voluntarily established and are developing among themselves cooperation based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, international solidarity, respect, equality and sovereignty and comradesly mutual aid.

The development of the world revolutionary process and the increased role of the socialist commonwealth in it have demanded a further solidarity among its member states as well as a unity of their actions on the international scene. "The prime concern for our party," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) Plenum of the Party Central Committee "will be in the future the strengthening of the socialist commonwealth. In unity lie our strength and the guarantee for ultimate success even in the most serious testings."³

The military cooperation of the socialist states and the combat alliance of their armed forces have firm political, economic, ideological and military-strategic bases which are determined by the uniformity of the state system and the economic basis, by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and by the common goals in the construction and defense of socialism against the encroachments of international imperialism.

The communist and workers parties are the organizing and directing force in strengthening the relationships among the fraternal socialist nations. The unbreakable alliance of the parties and the unity of their ideology, goals and will serve in further uniting the peoples of the socialist countries in the interests of building a new society, peace and democracy.

The communist and workers parties from the fraternal nations are the organizers of collective defense. Only they are capable of most completely carrying out the entire range of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military tasks in the interests of the international armed defense of socialism. The strengthening of the defense of the states and of the combat alliance of the armed forces are considered by the parties to be their program task. "The Soviet Union," the CPSU Program emphasizes, "considers as its international duty to provide, along with the other socialist countries, secure defense and security for the entire socialist camp."⁴ The SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Program states that the party makes its contribution to ensuring peace and security in a firm alliance with the USSR and the other socialist states "on the basis of an unshakable fraternity in arms with the Soviet Army and the armies of the other fraternal countries."⁵

The Report of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] to the 16th CPCZ Congress describes the strengthening of the Czechoslovak People's Army and as an inseparable component part of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states.⁶ The Ninth Extraordinary PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Congress pointed out that membership in the Warsaw Pact and a contribution to the creation and use of the collective potential of the Joint Armed Forces have been, are and will be the fundamental principle in Polish defense doctrine.⁷ The other parties of the fraternal countries adhere to a similar position in the strengthening of collective defense.

The activities of the communist and workers parties within the Warsaw Pact are of crucial significance for strengthening the cooperation of the fraternal armies and for raising their combat might. The meetings of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) are held on a level of the general and first secretaries of the party central committees and heads of state. This makes it possible to carry out the adopted decisions quickly and effectively by all the pact's members. The PCC sessions work out the basic areas of coalition military policy and the cardinal questions of strengthening the defense capability of the united states and raising the combat potential of the national and Joint Armed Forces.

The further strengthening of the defensive union of the fraternal states at the present stage has been brought about by a number of objective factors. The main ones are: the increased complexity and scale of tasks in the joint struggle

against the aggressive aspirations of international imperialism; the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs and the increased role of the moral factor in modern warfare; the heightening of the ideological struggle over military questions; the growth of international tasks for the armed forces of the socialist countries in ensuring peace.

In recent years, world imperialism has endeavored to integrate its efforts in the economic, political, ideological and military spheres for combating real socialism. In this situation as never before it is important to have a correct analysis of the military-political and strategic situation on the world scene and the prompt elaboration and implementation of effective measures to counter possible aggression by imperialism. "The aggressive intrigues of imperialism force us, along with the fraternal socialist states, to be concerned and to be seriously concerned," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "with maintaining defense capability on the proper level."⁸

The scientific and technical revolution in military affairs has also placed higher demands upon the strengthening of the defensive union. The creation and improvement of weapons of mass destruction have acutely posed the problem of a balance between the need for secure defense and the possibility of ensuring it. Never before have military equipment and weaponry been so complex or required such enormous expenditures while the necessity of replacing them has been of such short duration as at present. The basic weapons systems are now replaced every 10-12 years. Stagnation in this area is fraught with serious consequences. This problem has assumed particular urgency in line with the fact that the imperialist states and primarily the United States have constantly endeavored to achieve military and technical superiority over the socialist commonwealth nations.

Under present-day conditions, the dependence of the strengthening of collective defense upon the state of the economic and scientific-technical ties between the socialist systems has increased. Only by relying on close cooperation and on the economic and scientific-technical base of the commonwealth, and above all the Soviet Union, can the fraternal states successfully carry out the tasks of providing their armies with combat equipment and weapons.

The scientific-technical revolution in military affairs and the nature of a future war which imperialism could initiate have led to a greater role for the moral factor and have placed high demands on the moral-political and psychological preparation of the armed forces and all the people. The questions of the international indoctrination of the men presently hold an important place in moral-political training. In line with this, the role of the party has increased in raising the moral-political potential of the nations in the world socialist commonwealth and in indoctrinating the working masses and men of the fraternal armies in a spirit of socialist internationalism and a readiness for the joint defense of revolutionary victories.

In the present-day situation, the role of the theory of scientific communism has grown. In particular, of great significance is the further development of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army. Particular importance has been

assumed by a scientific analysis of urgent military theoretical problems in the area of military organizational development, military art, troop leadership and control, improving the operational, combat and moral-psychological training of the troops and ensuring high combat readiness. In being guided by the Marxist-Leninist methodology, the communist and workers parties have defined the main areas for the development of military scientific thought and have creatively resolved complex military-theoretical problems considering the occurring historical changes, the new balance of forces in the world and the development prospects of military affairs.

In recent years, the reactionary forces of imperialism have shown a greater effort to turn the ideological struggle against socialism into a "psychological" one. The aim of such "warfare" is to destabilize the existing system in the socialist commonwealth nations and by propaganda actions to disrupt military-political unity. The overt ideological subversion has been elevated to the rank of U.S. state policy and is a part of the global "crusade" against communism declared by President R. Reagan.

The exacerbation of the ideological struggle between the two systems has required the close coordination of work by the communist and workers parties in combating the evermore intense propaganda activities by imperialism which has endeavored to also refute or "revise" the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, to justify the increased militarism and arms race in the capitalist nations, their aggressive actions, and to distort the true aims and nature of the combat cooperation among the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. In this regard, particular urgency is assumed by the general task of the communist and workers parties as formulated by V. I. Lenin: "...To combat all the resistance of the capitalists, not only military and political, but also ideological, the most profound and strongest."⁹

At present, the role of the defense might of the socialist states has increased particularly for maintaining peace throughout the world. The military might of the socialist commonwealth is the bulwark of peace for everyone who is fighting against the threat of a new world war and who defends the future of mankind and its social progress. "The course of events in the world has confirmed the historic mission of the Warsaw Pact as a dependable shield for the independence and socialist victories of its member states and as a decisive factor for preserving peace and strengthening security."¹⁰

The increased role played by the communist parties in strengthening the military cooperation of the socialist states and the combat alliance of their armed forces as well as in the international defense of revolutionary victories is of an objective nature and is determined by the tasks of the present stage in the development of the world socialist commonwealth and by the tasks of fighting against the aggressive policy of imperialism and for the peace and security of peoples.

The fraternal parties have carried out enormous work in the area of further strengthening military cooperation. The subject of their constant concern includes the following: the coordinating of efforts in the development of the national armies, the increasing of their battleworthiness and combat readiness; the improving of military-technical cooperation and mutual aid in equipping the

armies with modern technology and weapons; the carrying out of joint military training measures, the exchange of experience in operational and combat training of the troops and fleets, the elaboration and introduction of advanced personnel training and indoctrination methods; improving cooperation in the training of highly skilled military personnel; the development of military science; the deepening of ties between the political bodies of the fraternal armies, the exchange of experience in party political work in developing a Marxist-Leninist ideology among the men and so forth.

In coordinating efforts to further strengthen the national armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, an important role is played by the PCC, the Ministers of Defense Committee and the leading bodies of the Joint Armed Forces. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out: "The organizational development of the Joint Armed Forces has been carried out smoothly. Here, as always, good work has been done by the Ministers of Defense Committee."¹¹

The use of the experience of the CPSU in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces has been of great importance in developing the armies of the socialist commonwealth nations. "There is scarcely a single area of our national defense," emphasized the GDR Minister of National Defense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, "where its development did not employ with great benefit the rich achievements of Soviet military science, the many years of combat experience of the Soviet commanders and political workers and the wisdom and vast knowledge of the Soviet party and state leaders."¹²

Due to the joint efforts of the communist and workers parties, the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth nations have a similar organizational structure and, in essence, a uniform, scientifically elaborated system for training and developing the armed services and branches of troops. All of these are constantly being improved on the basis of the most recent accomplishments of socialist military science.

One of the areas for strengthening the combat might of the fraternal armies is their equipping of modern weapons and combat equipment. Naturally, the questions of military-technical cooperation have been and are at the center of attention for the parties of the socialist commonwealth countries. The CPSU and the Soviet government have provided constant aid to the fraternal nations in equipping their armies with modern weapons. Of particularly great significance have been the deliveries of Soviet military equipment to the socialist states in the course of their struggle against the imperialist aggressors. During the period of the piratical U.S. war against Vietnam, the Soviet Union sent to Vietnam aircraft, antiaircraft missile weapons, artillery and firearms, ammunition and other military supplies. The First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, F. Castro, at the Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party pointed out that the existing development level of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and their superior equipping with modern combat technology would have been impossible without the enormous Soviet aid.¹³

Soviet military-technical assistance has been expressed not only in weapons deliveries. This has also involved assisting the socialist commonwealth nations in developing the defense industry and granting licenses for the right

to produce Soviet models of military equipment and weapons and the corresponding documents and technology. For example, Army Gen W. Jaruzelski has emphasized: "Soviet aid and military-technical cooperation have contributed and do contribute to the development of the Polish defense industry and to the equipping of our Armed Forces with remarkable modern weapons. They make it possible to maintain a high technical level in the Polish Army."¹⁴ The CSSR, Poland and the GDR play an important role in delivering modern weapons and combat equipment to the armies of the socialist commonwealth countries. The friendly armies utilize weapons and military equipment manufactured at defense enterprises of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Military-technical cooperation among the fraternal armies is also carried out by coordinating scientific research and experimental designing. There is the extensive practice of demonstration shows of models of combat equipment and weapons and the exchanging of specialists for providing aid and passing on experience in the mastery of new equipment and weapons.

In the further strengthening of the combat alliance among the fraternal armies, the communist parties give great importance to conducting joint military training measures which help to exchange experience in operational and combat training of the troops and fleets and to work out and introduce advanced training methods for the armed forces personnel. Within the Warsaw Pact, such cooperation is expressed in various forms such as joint exercises on varying scales, meetings and assemblies for the leadership of the allied armies, the elaboration and adoption of uniform documents on operational and combat training, the exchange of experience in setting up and utilizing training facilities, military scientific, training and procedural leadership and so forth.

A special place is held by the joint exercises which vary in scope, focus and composition of participants. They make it possible to test out theoretical provisions in practice, to elaborate uniform views on the principles and nature of combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare, to increase the combat teamwork of the units and formations and elaborate questions of cooperation among the national armies comprising the Joint Armed Forces. In addition, in the course of the exercises the command personnel gains practice in controlling multinational armed forces. In assessing the results of training the staffs, troops and naval forces as conducted in the autumn of 1982 under the code name "Shchit-82" [Shield-82], the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States, Mar SU V. G. Kulikov pointed out that the exercises were an important joint measure by the allied armies and a report on their readiness to defend revolutionary victories by joint efforts. The exercises helped to carry out the great and complex tasks set by the central committees of the fraternal parties in the area of increasing the combat might of the Joint Armed Forces.

Of the joint exercises conducted in 1982, of important significance for training the allied armies were also the exercises "Druzhiba-82" [Friendship-82] conducted on Czechoslovak territory with the participation of units and subunits from the East German Army, the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak Army and on Polish territory with the participation of units and subunits from the East German People's Army, the Polish Army and the Soviet Army. In being present at them, the First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and Chairman of the

Polish Council of Ministers W. Jaruzelski stated: "The exercises conducted on Polish territory are considered by us as very essential and important. They are being held in a special period in the life of our nation and this is characterized by the fact that life is being normalized in Poland. At the same time, we shall be ready to repel any aggressor and the 'Druzhiba-82' Exercises are evidence that the combat readiness of the units and subunits is on a high level."¹⁵

The nature of modern warfare significantly increases the demands made on the command, political and engineer-technical personnel. The Soviet military academies and schools play a major role in training them for the fraternal armies. For example, by the end of 1981, the number of leaders of the East German Army who had undergone the full course of instruction at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov exceeded 100. The Soviet military academies and schools as well as the various short retraining courses have been completed by several thousand Bulgarian servicemen.¹⁶

The training of military personnel for the friendly armies is also carried out in the military schools of the other Warsaw Pact countries. For example, representatives from other socialist state armies are studying in the Military Academy of the General Staff and other military schools of the Polish Army. Polish officers are being trained in the Military Academy of the Hungarian People's Army.

The joint training of officers from the allied armies has helped to deepen the unity of views on the fundamental problems of military theory and the actual conduct of combat operations under the conditions of modern warfare and serves as an important source for strengthening fraternity in arms.

The constant rise in the military, political and technical skills of officer personnel in the socialist state armies has been the result of constant attention from the fraternal parties. While in 1953, only 5 percent of the officers in the Bulgarian People's Army had a higher education, with 40 percent in 1969, in 1980, 76 percent of the officers had a higher and specialized secondary education. One out of every three officers had an engineer or technical education. At the beginning of the 1950's, in the Bulgarian Army there was not a single officer with an academic degree or title, and by the beginning of the 1980's, there were 35 professors and senior science associates first degree, 184 docents and senior science associates second degree, 22 doctors of sciences and 526 candidates of sciences.¹⁷ Analogous processes are occurring in the other armies of the socialist commonwealth nations.

The military personnel of the socialist commonwealth nations are marked primarily by professional preparedness, high political maturity and total dedication to the cause of communism and to the ideas of proletarian internationalism. The communist parties give great attention to increasing the party stratum among the military. The share of communists in the officer corps of the fraternal armies has steadily increased. While in 1950, among the officers of the Polish Army, members of the PZPR were around 40 percent, with over 56 percent in 1955, at the beginning of the 1980's the figure was over 85 percent.¹⁸ In the Romanian Army in 1949, the party stratum among the officers was 26

percent and at the beginning of the 1980's, it exceeded 86 percent.¹⁹ The communists who embody in flesh and blood the ideas of socialist internationalism are the unifying force in the socialist country armies and their combat fraternity.

The development of military-scientific ties between the fraternal armies is an important area for increasing the combat readiness and strengthening their cooperation. The parties focus the military and military-scientific personnel of the armies on profoundly understanding the essence and sociopolitical nature of modern-age wars, the developmental patterns of the armed forces, the principles of their organizational development and ways for increasing combat readiness.

The collaboration of the fraternal armies in the military-scientific area is based on the military-scientific foundation of the Soviet Armed Forces. This has brought together the enormous historical experience of the CPSU in defending socialism. "The inexhaustible treasurehouse of Soviet military science," wrote the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense, Army Gen M. Dzur, "is the basic source of knowledge for our command personnel."²⁰

The cooperation among the armies of the socialist commonwealth countries in the military-scientific area has made it possible to elaborate a general approach to solving fundamental questions of military organizational development, views on the nature of modern warfare, the methods of conducting it, the methods of training and indoctrinating the personnel and has provided the possibility of greater effectiveness in resolving many problems of military theory and practice.

On the basis of the decisions of communist and workers parties, all levels of political bodies carry out diverse work in the friendly armies from the main political directorates to the political bodies of the formations and units. This work has a planned, constant and purposeful nature. It is carried out by conducting joint measures in the area of party political and ideological indoctrination, meetings on various levels for the leaders and workers of political bodies on a multilateral and bilateral basis, the coordinating of party political work in the course of joint exercises and in the process of other military training measures, the holding of theoretical and practical scientific conferences, seminars and so forth.

Due to the collective efforts of the communist and workers parties in the socialist commonwealth nations, an effective and strong system of cooperation has come into being among the armed forces of the fraternal states, as based on the unchanging principles of socialist internationalism.

In the difficult present-day situation, the importance of military cooperation among the socialist commonwealth nations has grown. The Marxist-Leninist parties of the Warsaw Pact member states are doing everything necessary to prevent a new world war. This has been confirmed by the Political Declaration adopted at a meeting of the PCC in January of this year in Prague. This contained a range of new important proposals aimed at preserving peace in the world. At the same time, the parties are aware that along with peaceful initiatives, for maintaining peace it is essential to have a sufficient military potential among the socialist commonwealth countries.

Under the conditions where the ruling circles of the United States and the other NATO countries are intensifying the arms race in the hope of securing military superiority for themselves and are creating dangerous tension in international relations, the socialist commonwealth must show unflagging vigilance and constant attention to the strengthening of collective military defense for the revolutionary victories.

The fraternal nations have created and are maintaining a defense potential which dooms to defeat any attempt by the imperialists to deal with socialism using military force. "In the event of aggression," commented the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "our Armed Forces together with the fraternal socialist armies, will defend the socialist victories without any hesitation and with all decisiveness, using all the defense and economic might of our states."²¹

The increased role played by the communist parties in strengthening the military alliance of the armed forces is a natural process. It has been brought about by the complexity and responsibility of the tasks of defending the victories of the workers in the socialist commonwealth nations.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 46.
- ² [Not in text.]
- ³ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 22 noyabrya 1982 goda" [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 22 November 1982], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 18.
- ⁴ "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 111.
- ⁵ "IX s"yezd Sotsialisticheskoy yedinoi partii Germanii" [Ninth SED Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, pp 264-265.
- ⁶ "XVI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Chekhoslovakii" [16th CPCZ Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, pp 49-50.
- ⁷ PRAVDA, 21 July 1981.
- ⁸ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo...", p 18.
- ⁹ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 406.
- ¹⁰ "XII s"yezd Bolgarskoy kommunisticheskoy partii" [12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 139.
- ¹¹ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 6.
- ¹² KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 January 1978.

- ¹³ See "II s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Kuby" [Second Congress of the Cuban Communist Party], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 67.
- ¹⁴ KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 January 1978.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 30 March 1982.
- ¹⁶ EINHEIT, No 2, 1981, p 144; "Vekovaya družba, boyevoye bratstvo" [Age-Old Friendship, Combat Fraternity], Voenizdat, 1980, p 301.
- ¹⁷ "Bulgarskata kommunisticheska partiya i Narodnata armiya" [The Bulgarian Communist Party and the People's Army], Sofia, Voenno Izdatelstvo, 1976, pp 385-386; "Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma" [The Warsaw Pact--An Alliance for the Sake of Peace and Socialism], Voenizdat, 1980, pp 174, 175; VOENNOISTORICHESKI SBORNIK [Military History Collection], No 4, 1981, p 237.
- ¹⁸ "Droga do jedności polskiego ruchu robotniczego," Warsaw: MON, 1974, p 81; "Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz....," p 195.
- ¹⁹ "Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz....," p 204.
- ²⁰ KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 February 1978.
- ²¹ PRAVDA, 12 July 1982.

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'IMPERIALISM'S NEOCOLONIAL WARS' DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 58-65

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Col G. Malinovskiy: "The Neocolonial Wars of Imperialism"]

[Text] A further rise in the might and influence of socialism on mankind's development is a reality of the end of the 20th Century. The national liberation movement has won historic victories and at the end of the 1970's the elimination of the colonial empires was finished and in their ruins scores of new young states were formed. These young states took over control of the national resources and they play a major role in world politics. Many of them have rejected the capitalist path of development and follow socialism. This has restricted the sphere of imperialist domination in the world.

The greater independence of the liberated countries is not to the liking of the imperialists. In endeavoring to maintain their domination over these countries, they have employed various forms and methods including neocolonial wars. A scientific analysis of these wars is essential for unmasking the reactionary essence of imperialism and checking its aggressive actions.

The term "neocolonial war" appeared in the 1960's in the concluding stage of the collapse of the colonial system, when "classic" colonialism was replaced by neocolonialism, a new system of imperialist exploitation for the peoples of the liberated countries. The basic efforts of neocolonialism were aimed at preventing the socialist path of development in these countries and keeping the young states in the orbit of world capitalism in the aim of continuing their suppression and use in the struggle against real socialism and the socialist-oriented countries.

The imperialists resorted to all possible means for achieving these goals. In the forefront they put the economic methods of exploiting the peoples in the liberated countries, they imposed on them unequal treaties, installed puppet regimes and so forth. But when these methods did not help, the imperialists initiated wars which in our literature are termed neocolonial¹ and have been analyzed in a number of special works.² The given term is also employed in international documents and in particular in the "Appeal to the World Community" of the Presidium of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization over aggression by South Africa, Zaire and mercenaries from the imperialist states

against Angola in 1975-1976.³ Thus, the concept of "neocolonial war" has entered scientific usage, official documents, the periodic press and the vocabulary of Russian.⁴ This is why more and more often attention is drawn to the need for studying such wars.⁵

In examining the dialectics of the relationship of neocolonial and colonial wars, it is essential to emphasize that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between the wars of "classic" colonialism and present-day. The history of the postwar period shows that many wars which have been waged by the imperialists even during the time of the existence of colonial regimes, for example, the wars of the English colonialists against Malaya in 1948-1955 and Kenya in 1952-1956, even then "to a significant degree were aimed at gaining time and providing prerequisites for establishing a political structure capable to one degree or another of guaranteeing the development of the corresponding countries after the proclamation of independence in a direction beneficial for yesterday's colonialists."⁶ As the colonial empires collapsed and new states appeared, the imperialists were forced to adjust their colonial policy. This was appropriately reflected in the social content of their wars against the colonial peoples fighting for independence. The wars of the Portuguese colonialists in Angola, Mozambique and the Rhodesian racists against the people of Zimbabwe in their concluding stage began to assume a neocolonial character. The war of South Africa in Namibia has now assumed such a character.

Inherent to the neocolonial wars are many traits of the wars of "traditional" colonialism and in their form they are largely similar to colonial wars. At the same time, neocolonial wars differ essentially from the latter in a number of particular features which become ever-starker as the revolutionary process develops and as imperialism adjusts to the new situation in the world. This applies primarily to their political content which, V. I. Lenin pointed out, is the main thing in assessing any war and is determined by the policy which has given rise to the given war and by its goals.⁷

The aggressive policy of imperialism is the cause of the neocolonial wars. It also determines their essence. For precisely this reason the Prague political declaration of the Warsaw Pact states (1983) emphasized that the final elimination of all vestiges of colonialism and racism, the abandoning of the policy of neocolonial, suppression and exploitation of other peoples are necessary for eliminating the causes of many conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁸

In contrast to the colonial wars which the imperialists waged for the sake of maintaining of imposing on peoples direct political domination and economic enslavement, the neocolonial wars are waged in the aim of suppressing the liberation struggle of the peoples in the dependent countries for true national sovereignty and for turning these states into "new type" colonies, for holding them in their dependence, for overthrowing progressive systems in the sovereign developing states and establishing puppet regimes there and exploiting their peoples. In accord with the goals and objects of the aggression, it is possible to establish **two varieties of neocolonial wars:**

- 1) Wars by imperialist states against the peoples of dependent countries fighting for true national sovereignty (the U.S. war against the peoples of

South Vietnam in 1964-1975, Laos in 1964-1973 and Cambodia in 1970-1973, the intervention by a number of NATO countries in Zaire in 1978 and now the United States is initiating a similar war in El Salvador);

2) Wars by the imperialist powers against sovereign developing states (the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Israeli aggression against Egypt and Syria in 1967, the imperialist aggression against Angola in 1975-1976).

It is essential to point out that the proportional amount of the second type of wars against the sovereign developing states has been constantly growing (see Diagram 1). However, in both instances by such wars world imperialism headed by the United States frequently endeavors to prevent the development of the liberated countries along a socialist path and to establish capitalist relations in them. Because of this, the neocolonial wars have assumed a clearly expressed class, capitalist focus. This social focus and the political goals of the neocolonial wars determine their unjust, reactionary nature.

An analysis of the political content of the wars in the zone of the national liberation movement has shown that while in 1945-1960, 38 percent of the wars had a neocolonial character, while in 1971-1982, neocolonial wars already comprised 63 percent.⁹ At the same, the share of colonial wars has declined from 57 to 25 percent (see Diagram 2). Thus, with the downfall of the colonial empires and the formation of the new states, the sphere of colonial wars has been significantly narrowed.¹⁰ These have been replaced by neocolonial aggressions by the imperialists,¹¹ and these are becoming the **typical wars** of our times. In the postwar period, more than one-half of them was instigated by the imperialists in Asia (see Diagram 3).




Diagram 1




Diagram 2




Diagram 3

In the not distant past, the colonialists did not endeavor to conceal or justify their aggression against the freedom-loving peoples. The right of the strong was their sole argument. But now the role of the world community, the United Nations and regional international organizations has increased significantly in checking the aggressive aspirations of the imperialists. For this reason, the neocolonial are paying evermore attention to a propaganda cover for the aggressions against the liberated nations, endeavoring to conceal their class nature and camouflage the two reasons and goals. They have spread stories about the "blame" of the peoples in the former colonies for initiating the wars, they have represented the national liberation wars as the "intrigues of international communism" and have declared their rapacious actions as the "defense of the free world."

At present the reactionary circles of imperialism are initiating a campaign against the national liberation movements behind the screen of combating international terrorism. "In the language of the Reagan Administration," commented the General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party, Gus Hall, "any struggle for national liberation, for socialism, any popular movements and the struggle against imperialism and reactionary military-fascist dictatorships are styled 'international terrorism'..."¹² Here the Washington politicians have announced the complicity of the Soviet Union in "preparing, financing and equipping international terrorism...."¹³ In identifying the legitimate struggle of peoples for national and social liberation with "international terrorism," the White House is endeavoring, on the one hand, to distort and defame the policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries toward the national liberation movement and to discredit the anti-imperialist struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, and on the other, to find justification for their policy of intervention in the internal affairs of the developing countries and suppressing the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples by methods of actual terrorism.

But, as is known, injustice can never be hidden, no matter how the apologists of imperialism twist and turn in justifying the "right" of intervening into the internal affairs of the liberated nations, and neocolonial wars have been and remain unjust and reactionary.

In the wars against the peoples of the dependent nations, in a number of instances fighting on the side of the imperialists and the puppet regimes have been a portion of the local population including the servicemen of the official army, bureaucrats from the state apparatus, private entrepreneurs and so forth. In this regard, such wars become wars of the imperialists and the local reaction against a majority of the suppressed people. This was particularly apparent in the wars in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Zaire.

In recent years, in fearing to be known as aggressors, the neocolonialists more and more often have preferred to avoid outright, direct military operations against the freedom-loving peoples and by various stratagems to conceal their involvement in suppressing the liberation movement.

The neocolonialists have repeatedly carried out aggression against freedom-loving peoples using the hands of others and employing for this purpose the armies of satellites, detachments of mercenaries or local counterrevolutionary forces. Thus, for intervention in Angola in 1975-1976, troops from South Africa and Zaire were involved as well as mercenary bands from various capitalist states and the CIA-supported organizations of the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (National Union for the Full Independence of Angola). The Somali army was used for aggression against revolutionary Ethiopia.

In order to conceal their aggressive actions, the imperialists have endeavored to give their military intervention the appearance of an internal struggle, involving the reactionary forces of the developing states for this. An example here would be the use of rightist forces in Lebanon for defeating the Palestinian movement and the national patriotic forces of the nation. In order to strangle the people's revolutions in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the United States have staffed, armed and trained bands of counterrevolutionaries who have fled from these countries.

In the strategy of neocolonial, special significance is given to Israel which the imperialist states, and primarily the United States, have employed as a weapon in the struggle against the liberation movement of the Arab peoples as well as for establishing their rule in the Near and Middle East. Using the Israeli military, international imperialism in 1956 and 1967 endeavored to crush the progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria and to put their own puppets in power there. At present, Tel-Aviv is carrying out piratical aggression against Lebanon and Washington has been a direct co-participant in this, in providing material and political support for the aggressor.

The "motley" and "multinational" composition of the participants in imperialist aggression against the liberated nations has given the neocolonial wars an evermore "collective" nature. But while in the past the chief motive for involving the colonialists in collective military campaigns was the fear of losing their share in dividing up the spoils, at present in the forefront is the desire of the imperialists to conceal their involvement in aggressions behind a screen of "international action" and thereby avoid personal responsibility and condemnation by the world community and the United Nations. This is confirmed by facts of symbolic involvement of satellite troops in the aggressions of imperialist powers. Thus, troops from six U.S. "Allies" during the period of aggression in South Vietnam comprised only 11.6 percent of all the interventionist forces, while during the U.S. intervention into the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Latin American brigade organized from troops of four states made up only 5.2 percent of the total invasion forces.¹⁵

More and more frequently imperialist aggression against sovereign developing states has assumed the form of an "undeclared war." It is a question not only of initiating and conducting aggression without its formal, legal declaration. We have in mind the conducting of military operations by the imperialists and their cohorts from the territories of neighboring countries. An example of this would be the aggression of the United States and the reactionary states against Afghanistan; South Africa against Angola, Mozambique and the other "frontline" states in the south of Africa; the aggression of the United States, Honduras and Guatemala against Nicaragua. The carrying out of aggression by the neocolonialists in the form of an "undeclared war" is largely caused by the fact that the present-day international situation has significantly restricted their opportunities for overtly employing their troops to overthrow progressive regimes.

In conducting neocolonial wars, the imperialists have employed barbarian types of weapons banned by international law and the most atrocious methods. Chemical weapons and napalm, cluster, cannister, phosphorous and fuel-air explosive bombs, "the strategic hamlets," artificially caused downpours of destructive force and fire storms in forests--this is a far-from-complete list of the crimes of modern-day colonialists. The destruction of the women, children and old people in Songmi, Mosote, Sabra and Shatila have become synonyms of the atrocities of Nazism in Katyn, Lidica and Oradour. All of this has led to enormous human sacrifices, particularly among the civilian population.¹⁷ The International Commission to Investigate Israeli Crimes against the Lebanese and Palestinian Peoples has judged the actions by the Israeli aggressors in Lebanon as an international crime. What the occupiers in Beirut have done is true genocide toward the Arab peoples, the TASS Declaration states. And Washington, along with Tel-Aviv, bears responsibility for the destruction."¹⁸

In analyzing events occurring in the zone of the former colonial periphery, it is essential, V. I. Lenin pointed out, to consider the course of the clash between the world forces of socialism and imperialism.¹⁹ The consistent support by the socialist countries and by all progressive forces for the national liberation wars of peoples has led to a situation where, in essence, not only the immediate participants in the struggle against neocolonialism are clashing the front. In line with this, the repelling of neocolonial aggression is becoming a component part in the world-wide struggle of the forces of socialism and progress against the forces of imperialism and reaction. This introduces new aspects into the problem of the balance of forces among the fighting sides in the zone of the national liberation movement. At present, it is no longer possible to talk about the absolute numerical and military-technical superiority of the aggressor armies over the armies of the young national states. In terms of their combat capabilities, the armies of a number of young states, in being supported by the socialist countries, are not inferior to the aggressor armies and at times even surpass them. This was demonstrated, in particular, by the military operations in Angola in 1975-1976 and on the Horn of Africa in 1977-1978. Here the crucial contribution has been made by the Soviet Union which, along with the other fraternal countries, has helped to strengthen the defenses of Angola, Afghanistan and Ethiopia. This made it possible for them to repel the imperialist-inspired aggression and defend the revolutionary victories.²⁰ "...If aid had not been provided from the great Soviet Union to heroic Afghanistan," stated Babrak Karmal, "at present a revolutionary, free, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan would not exist."²¹

Furthermore, one must take into account the significantly increased role of external factors for the outcome of the neocolonialist wars. In addition to the material and technical aid from world socialism, ever-greater significance is being assumed by the political and diplomatic support for the struggle of the young states and the peoples in the dependent countries by the entire socialist commonwealth, the progressive states and social organizations. This more and more often leads to a situation where the imperialists, even with numerical and military-technical superiority over the national liberation forces, are unable to win a victory. The Israeli aggressors were unable to achieve their main goal of destroying the Palestine Liberation Organization. Moreover, this aggression meant for Israel a major political and moral defeat as well as growing isolation on the international scene. The experience of the past wars shows that an unique "equilibrium of forces" has repeatedly developed whereby the neocolonialists have been unable to achieve victory by military means and the outcome of the war was determined at the conference table. This is confirmed, in particular, by the experience of imperialist aggression in Indochina.

Moreover, in the course of the further change in the balance of forces on the world scene in favor of socialism, the opportunities are increased for the freedom-loving peoples to repulse the neocolonialist aggression and achieve victory. This is confirmed by the results of the struggle by the peoples of the Indochinese countries, Ethiopia and Angola and by the self-sacrifice and heroism of the Palestinian fighters who provided a worthy rebuff to Israeli aggression in Lebanon. The Message of the CPSU Central Committee and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, Y. Arafat, states: "The truth has been reconfirmed that it is impossible to

crush a people convinced of the rightness of their cause."²² All of this inspires the fighters to eliminate the vestiges of colonial slavery and to achieve true freedom and independence.

Regardless of the broad use of military force by imperialism, it has not succeeded either in eliminating or even stopping the historically insurmountable development of the liberation struggle of peoples. However, the colonialists have not learned the lessons of history. In endeavoring to recover their former role of the disposals of the fates of peoples, they directly or by roundabout means are inspiring wars and military conflicts in various regions of the world. This can be seen from the events in the Near and Middle East, the African Continent, in Central America and the South Atlantic.

Under these conditions, of enormous significance for the successful struggle of the liberated countries against imperialist aggression is the international policy of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth aimed at supporting the revolutionary struggle of peoples. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov, reaffirmed: "We decisively and unswervingly are on the side of those who even now are forced to fight for freedom and independence, for the very existence of their peoples, of those who are forced to repel the aggressor's pressure or are subjected to the threat of aggression."²³

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ See M. Mnatsakanyan, "Kolonializm i yego istoricheskiye formy" [Colonialism and Its Historical Forms], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 189; V. Kremenyuk, "Politika SShA v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh" [U.S. Policy in the Developing Countries], Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1977, pp 14-15; "Voyna i armiya" [War and the Army], Voenizdat, 1977, p 91; "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Military Art], Voenizdat, 1979, p 316; V. Serebryanikov, "Osnovy marksistsko-leninskogo ucheniya o voyne i armii" [Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Teachings on War and the Army], Voenizdat, 1982, p 69; PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 12, 1974, p 80; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1974, p 93; No 1, 1978, p 7; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 10, 1974, p 79; PRAVDA, 2 July 1967; 22 March and 23 April 1975; I. Kende, "Guerres locales en Asie, en Afrique et en Amerique Latine (1945-1969)," Budapest, 1973, p 34.
- ² See L. Sosnovskiy, "The Strategy of U.S. Neocolonial Wars," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 9, 1971; V. Golubev, "Voyennyye aspekty neokolonial'noy politiki imperializma" [Military Aspects of the Neocolonial Policy of Imperialism], Moscow, VPA, 1978, pp 120-138.
- ³ Document No 2(18)B "Third Meeting of the ASPSO Presidium," Aden, 20 January 1976.
- ⁴ See "Novyye slova i znacheniya" [New Words and Meanings], Reference Dictionary, Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1971, p 310.

- ⁵ See Ye. Rybkin, "The Importance of Leninist Methodology for Analyzing the Social Nature of Wars in the Postwar Period," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1982, pp 3, 7.
- ⁶ K. N. Brutents, "Novaya forma poraboshcheniya narodov" [A New Form of Enslaving Peoples], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, pp 17-18.
- ⁷ See V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, pp 82, 161, 165; Vol 32, p 77.
- ⁸ See PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.
- ⁹ In the category of neocolonial wars are 47 of the 88 local wars and military conflicts initiated by the imperialists in the zone of the national liberation movement in 1945-1982 (author's calculation).
- ¹⁰ This has been pointed out by a number of researchers. See N. Pukhovskiy, "O voyne i mira" [On War and Peace], Moscow, Mysl', 1965, p 82; Ye. Rybkin, "The Importance of Leninist Methodology...", VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1982, p 7).
- ¹¹ See V. Kremen'yuk, "Politika SShA v....," pp 14-15.
- ¹² "Privetstviya XXVI s"yezdu KPSS ot kommunisticheskikh, rabochikh, natsional'no-demokraticheskikh i sotsialisticheskikh partiy" [Greetings to the 26th CPSU Congress from the Communists, Workers, National-Democratic and Socialist Parties], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 230.
- ¹³ MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 10, 1981, p 31.
- ¹⁴ [Not in text.]
- ¹⁵ Calculated from: "Voyenno-blokovaya politika imperializma" [The Military Bloc Policy of Imperialism], Voenizdat, 1980, pp 306, 312.
- ¹⁶ [Not in text.]
- ¹⁷ While during the years of World War II, civilians comprised 50 percent of the casualties, in Vietnam the figure was 70 percent and in Lebanon already 90 percent. (PRAVDA, 22 September 1982.)
- ¹⁸ TASS Declaration (PRAVDA, 2 August 1982).
- ¹⁹ See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 242.
- ²⁰ See "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp 12-13.
- ²¹ "Privetstviya XXVI s"yezdu....," p 307.
- ²² PRAVDA, 29 November 1982.

²³ Ibid., 22 December 1982.

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COMMENTARY ON WESTERN VIEWS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 66-72

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col V. Karnoukhov and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col I. Slivin: "On Military Organizational Development in the Warsaw Pact Countries"]

[Text] The military-political defensive alliance of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact and established with the sole goal of opposing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, for more than a quarter of a century has dependably served the cause of peace and securely defended the socialist victories of the peoples.¹

The collective defense of socialist victories has clearly not been to the liking of the most militant imperialist circles, particularly American. In conducting a course of further exacerbating international tension and in endeavoring to disrupt the existing military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the present U.S. leaders along with their partners in the aggressive blocs have initiated a political, ideological and economic offensive against socialism. Here, without having any arguments in their favor, they have resorted to the most unconscientious slandering, to the distorting of facts and their falsification. The words of V. I. Lenin are truly prophetic: "...If they cannot come at us now with weapons in hand, they will come with the weapons of lies and slander...."²

The Warsaw Pact is one of the objects of broad ideological subversion by imperialism. The bourgeois ideologists and politicians have endeavored first of all to distort and falsify the nature of the Warsaw Pact, the focus of its military policy and principles of military organizational development and distort the purpose and functions of the armed forces in the socialist commonwealth countries. Here particular emphasis has been put on representing the actions of the USSR and the fraternal socialist nations as aggressive and having an "expansionistic" nature. For this, the corresponding "theoretical" base has been provided and the notorious myth of the "Soviet military threat" is exaggerated in every possible way.

In our days on the general platform of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, one can observe an interaction and increased activity on the part of the most diverse bourgeois ideologists. One of the most active anti-Soviet organizations

in the United States is the so-called "Committee on the Existing Danger" which brings together in its ranks representatives from influential financial, military and academic circles. The former deputy secretary of state in the Johnson Administration and one of the instigators of the escalated U.S. aggression in Vietnam, W. Rostow, has become the committee chairman. Its members also include R. Allen, W. Casey, J. Kirkpatrick, J. Kemp and others. They are all united by rabid anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

A whole group of bourgeois "theoreticians," "researchers" and "specialists" on the socialist countries is presently "at work" on the same falsifying wave. Among them are J. Douglas, C. Joly, B. Semmel, F. Seidler, S. Tiedtke, J. M. Dayer, A. Kriegel, F. Deveille, A. Eide, M. Thee and others. They are all specialized in distorting the domestic and foreign policy of the socialist countries which are carrying out measures to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. The servants of imperialism have set forward their views and concepts in a whole series of works published in recent years.³

The falsifiers assert that the Warsaw Pact possesses "the might surpassing the amounts of necessary defense potential,"⁴ and is endeavoring "to destabilize Western Europe" and carry out its "lightning-like capture."⁵ Some of them have stated that supposedly the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is "basically offensive" while that of NATO is "basically defensive."⁶

Bourgeois historians and sociologists have endeavored to ascribe to the socialist commonwealth countries and to the Warsaw Pact those traits which are inherent to imperialism and its military blocs. Thus, they constantly and tenaciously assert that militarism is "many-faced" and has a "global nature," and that it is inherent to both the capitalist and socialist nations.⁷

All the arguments by bourgeois ideologists on the "aggressiveness" of the socialist commonwealth nations, on the "unpredictability" of their foreign policy actions and on the "supremacy" of the Warsaw Pact countries in the military area have no basis. They are clearly of a falsifying nature.

The baselessness and falseness of such fabrications have been clearly unmasked in the book prepared by competent Soviet bodies "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [From Whence Derives the Threat to Peace].

The assertions that the USSR presently possesses superiority over the United States in any type of military might do not conform to reality.⁹

It is essential to emphasize that the shoddy myth about the "Soviet military threat" which supposedly is forcing the West to arm intensely has been employed by imperialist propaganda as a smokescreen in concealing the U.S. and NATO aspirations. "The myth about the 'Soviet military threat'," pointed out the Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "has been put into circulation by those who stand to gain from the arms race, for massed ideological preparation of aggression, in order to mislead the international community and to dampen the ardor of its actions against the U.S. and NATO militaristic plans."¹⁰

The foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact member nations is based on a policy of peace, friendship and cooperation between peoples. Peace and not war is essential for socialist and communist construction. If the socialist countries nevertheless are forced to maintain their defense capability on the proper level and improve their armed forces, this has been brought about not by any internal factors of their development, but rather by the conditions of the present-day international situation and its acute exacerbation caused by imperialism and primarily American imperialism which has openly proclaimed a policy of preparing for nuclear missile war against the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth countries.

In terms of its goals, tasks and nature, the Warsaw Pact differs fundamentally from the imperialist aggressive military-political blocs. This is a strictly defensive military-political alliance created exclusively for defending the socialist victories against the aggressive encroachments of imperialism. "The Warsaw Pact," emphasized the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ], Gustav Husak, in the Accountability Report at the 16th CPCZ Congress, "plays an irreplaceable role in the joint efforts of the socialist countries to ensure a peaceful future for society."¹¹ Its members threaten no one, they do not intend to attack anyone, they do not claim foreign territories and do not intervene into the internal affairs of other countries. "The Warsaw Pact," said the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], Comrade Janos Kadar, at the 12th MSZMP Congress, "is not working for military superiority and does not seek to impose its will on the other side...."¹²

The just, humanistic aims of the peace-loving course by the fraternal socialist nations are also manifested in their coordinated military policy which defines the goals and tasks of the organizational development of the armed forces and creates favorable conditions for constructing socialism and communism and securely defending the socialist states. Soviet military doctrine has a strictly defensive purpose. It excludes preventive wars and the "first strike" concept."¹³ The efforts of the socialist commonwealth countries are aimed at preventing the development of events in the world up to a point of a first strike or any other strike and to prevent the very threat of the outbreak of war. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in the report "Sixty Years of the USSR" said that "...in Washington arguments are heard on the possibility of a 'limited,' 'extended' and other varieties of nuclear war...." He went on to add: "One must truly be blind to the realities of our age not to see that wherever or however a nuclear conflagration broke out, it inevitably would go out of control and cause a universal disaster."¹⁴

Certainly the defensive focus of our military doctrine has nothing in common with passivity. Soviet military doctrine fuses together the peace-loving nature of Soviet foreign policy and the constant readiness of the Soviet state to decisively repulse any aggressor.

In knowing the habits and nature of the aggressive forces, commented the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the USSR will maintain high vigilance and constant combat readiness of its Armed Forces on a level of today's demands. Our defensive doctrine designed exclusively to repel an external threat will not have a passive nature. It, as always, will be based on the permanent

foundation of Lenin's teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland. In the event of aggression, our Armed Forces together with the fraternal socialist armies will defend the victories of socialism without any hesitation, with all decisiveness and employing all the defense and economic might of our states.¹⁵

The carrying out of measures within the Warsaw Pact to further strengthen the combat alliance of the fraternal socialist armies and to increase their combat potential, combat capability and readiness does not contradict the peace-loving foreign policy course of the socialist states. But the falsifiers view these actions by the socialist countries in a completely different manner. Just how far the bourgeois ideologists go to distort the sense and content of the measures carried out by the USSR and the socialist commonwealth countries to improve the international situation is clearly apparent from the "research" conducted by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies. In the 12th issue of the annual "The Military Balance 1980-1981,"¹⁶ the course of the NATO nations to expand military preparations is justified by the fact that this bloc supposedly has been confronted with the "growing Soviet military potential." The compilers of this "work" see a danger for NATO also in the fact that the USSR has reduced its armed forces in Eastern Europe and in particular has pulled one tank division out of the GDR, since this supposedly raises the question of a corresponding reduction in the NATO troops.

As was pointed out in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Member States adopted at a session of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague on 5 January 1983, the Warsaw Pact states are not striving for military superiority over the NATO states and do not intend to attack them or any other country in Europe or beyond.¹⁷

In recent years, bourgeois political scientists and historians have intensified their attempts to falsify and distort the nature of the relationships between the Warsaw Pact states. The slanderers have been particularly adroit on the question of the role and place of the USSR in this organization. There is the rather widely held thesis on the "subordination" of the Warsaw Pact countries to the Soviet Union and their "dependence" upon it.¹⁸ Works are also encountered where the authors have endeavored to assert that the USSR supposedly exercises military "control" over the other Warsaw Pact members. In this unseemly competition, such long familiar bourgeois military historians and Sovietologists as the director of the program for defense research at Edinburgh University, J. Erickson, the consultant of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, M. Mackintosh, and a number of others have particularly distinguished themselves. In 1981, their collective monograph was published in London under the title "Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent." The authors of this rather bulky work by various methods have endeavored to distort the relations between the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth countries, particularly in the defense area and to slander the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. Thus, M. Mackintosh asserts that supposedly Soviet military control over the European socialist nations is the determining trait of these relations.¹⁹

All the assertions by the enemies of socialism are completely false. They are repudiated both by the documents and by life itself. The equal, truly

fraternal nature of relations between the Warsaw Pact members was legally reinforced by the very content of the "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid" of 14 May 1955. Thus, the Preamble to the Treaty, along with other provisions, states that it has been concluded "in the interests of further strengthening and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual aid in accord with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the states as well as nonintervention into their internal affairs...."²⁰

Of particular interest is Article 8 of the Treaty which provides that the agreeing parties will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in the aim of further developing and strengthening the economic and cultural ties between them.²¹

These principles are particularly apparent in the work of the collective leading bodies of the Warsaw Pact and primarily the Political Consultative Committee, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Committee and the Ministers of Defense Committee.

In discussing all questions brought up for their review, the principle of sovereign equality is strictly observed. The representatives of the allied states have the same rights. The collective discussion of the international situation and the generalizing of experience in carrying out joint actions make it possible for the participants of the sessions to profoundly disclose the general patterns and trends in world development, to define the main area and outline correct guidelines for conducting a coordinated policy.

The friendship and equal collaboration of the Warsaw Pact member states have been constantly developing and growing stronger. This has also been repeatedly emphasized in the jointly elaborated and adopted documents.

The Prague (1983) Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States has pointed out that "one of the major accomplishments of socialism has been the formation of a new type of international relations based upon voluntary, equal cooperation and international solidarity among the sovereign socialist states. The participants of the meeting, in expressing the will of their communist parties and peoples, confirm a determination to further strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries, to develop and deepen political, economic and cultural collaboration and to join efforts in the struggle for the cause of peace and progress.... The states participating in the meeting emphasize that each people has a sovereign right, freely without any outside intervention, to decide how it will live, what sort of social system is to be established and equally the legitimate right to defend its choice."²²

The equal, amicable nature of the relations between all the socialist commonwealth countries, including the Warsaw Pact members, is reflected and strengthened in the leading party documents of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties.

As was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, truly just, equal and fraternal relations have been established between all the socialist commonwealth countries and these relations are steadily developing in accord with the principle of socialist internationalism. This has been unprecedented in history. "The first concern of our party," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU

Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "will be to further strengthen the socialist commonwealth. In unity lie our strength and the guarantee for ultimate success even in the most serious testings."²³

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], Comrade E. Honecker pointed out at the Tenth SED Congress: "Our socialist commonwealth has proven to be an alliance of a completely new type which is based upon uniform socioeconomic and political bases, on a single ideology of Marxism-Leninism, on a commonness of communist goals and interests and on the international solidarity of workers."²⁴

The brunt of ideological subversion by the enemies of socialism is aimed primarily at distorting the role and place of the Marxist-Leninist parties in the social life of the socialist commonwealth nations, in military organizational development and in the strengthening of the defense capability of their states. The bourgeois ideologists have endeavored to establish the need to remove the communist parties from state administration, from the leadership of the economy, science and military organizational development, that is, from the fundamental tasks of creating a new society and its armed defense.²⁵ For example, attempts to weaken the revolutionary party and its leading role in society have occurred in Poland.

During the period of the crisis situation which arose in Poland in 1980-1982, the forces of the internal revolution, in being inspired and supported in every possible way by imperialism, primarily American, developed massed ideological and other attacks on the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], endeavoring to weaken its influence in society and destroy the victories of socialism.

Bourgeois ideologists and sociologists have resorted to the most diverse stratagems to distort the organizational principles in the Warsaw Pact armies and particularly the basic principle of leadership over the armed forces by the Marxist-Leninist parties. They have endeavored either to completely deny the necessity of such leadership, as has been done, for example by Z. Brzezinski,²⁶ or to distort its essence and ascribe alien functions to the communist parties. The latter is inherent to a majority of the modern bourgeois falsifiers, in particular to such an "expert" on the Soviet Union as the not unknown anti-communist Raymond Aron.²⁷

The CPSU and all the fraternal parties in the socialist commonwealth countries have always been against narrowing the sphere of party leadership. In speaking at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, said that party leadership encompasses all areas of activity for the workers, state bodies, public organizations and officials related to the strengthening of the material and spiritual bases of national defense capability as well as the combat might and readiness of the Army and Navy. The CPSU elaborates military doctrine and military policy, it organizes their successive implementation and directs the development of Soviet military science and military art.²⁸

Particular attention "has been given by the party to indoctrinating in the men a profound communist conviction, ardent Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, unflinching loyalty to the cause of October, to the heroic

revolutionary, military and labor traditions and a readiness to carry out a feat for the sake of the motherland."²⁹ This applies fully to all the fraternal communist and workers parties in the socialist commonwealth nations.

It must also be pointed out that leadership by the communist and workers parties over all social processes is carried out not by sheer administrative or executive methods, not by the giving of commands, as the falsifiers feel, but rather by their inherent forms and methods of political, organizational and ideological indoctrinational work.

The increased role played by the Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist commonwealth nations in military organizational development, as is known, has been brought about by a whole series of factors, including: by the greater complexity and extent of the tasks related to ensuring the security of the fraternal countries under present-day conditions, by the profound qualitative changes in military affairs, by the increased significance of the moral-political state of the troops in a war and by the significant increase in the international tasks related to the defense of socialism.

The enormous experience of the CPSU plays a particular role in successfully solving all of these and many other problems. Its consistent Leninist internationalist policy is approved and supported by all the fraternal parties.

This is the truth. All the fabrications by bourgeois ideologists and political scientists are powerless against it. However the falsifiers may try, they will not succeed in casting a shadow on the noble role and goals of the defensive military-political alliance among the socialist commonwealth countries.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 6.

² V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 366.

³ J. Douglas, "Soviet Military Strategy in Europe," New York, Pergamon Press, 1980; B. Semmel (Ed.), "Marxism and the Science of War," Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981; A. Kriegel, "Le communisme au jour le jour," Paris, Hachette, 1979.

⁴ F. Seidler, "Krieg oder Frieden. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Sicherheitspolitik. Eine Einführung," Gutersloh, Bernhard und Gracie, 1980, p 70.

⁵ C. Joly, "Silent Night. The Defeat of NATO," London, Cassel, 1980, p 9.

⁶ S. Tiedtke, "Rüstungskontrolle aus Sowjetischer sicht. Die Rahmenbedingungen der sowjetischen MBFR--Politik," Frankfurt am Main, Campos, 1980, p 81.

⁷ A. Eide, M. Three (Eds.), "Problems of Contemporary Militarism," London, Croom Helm, 1980, p 320.

- ⁸ [Not in text.]
- ⁹ See PRAVDA, 7 December 1982.
- ¹⁰ D. F. Ustinov, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland, the Cause of Communism], Voenizdat, 1982, p 50.
- ¹¹ PRAVDA, 7 April 1981.
- ¹² Ibid., 25 March 1980.
- ¹³ Ibid., 3 November 1981.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 22 December 1982.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 12 July 1982.
- ¹⁶ "The Military Balance 1980-1981," London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980.
- ¹⁷ See PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.
- ¹⁸ W. Brunz, "Deutsche beziehungen Prämissen, Probleme, Perspektiven," Opladen, Leske, 1979, p 90-91; P. Wandyez, "The United States and Poland," Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1980, p 357.
- ¹⁹ K. Dawisha, P. Hanson (Ed.), "Soviet-East German Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent," London, Heinemann, 1981, p 137.
- ²⁰ "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora. Dokumenty i materialy 1955-1980" [The Warsaw Pact Organization. Documents and Materials 1955-1980], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p 6.
- ²¹ Ibid., p 9.
- ²² PRAVDA, 7 January 1983.
- ²³ Ibid., 23 November 1982.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 12 April 1981.
- ²⁵ E. Barker, "Die Rolle der Parteiorgane in der Sowjetischen Wirtschaftslenkung 1957-1965," Berlin, 1973, pp 4, 18.
- ²⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era," The Viking Press, New York, 1970, pp 84, 87.
- ²⁷ Raymond Aron, "Le Spectateur engagé. Entretiens avec, Jean-Louis Missilka et Dominique Wolton," Julliard, Paris, 1981, pp 197, 199, 205, 206.
- ²⁸ See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 May 1982.
- ²⁹ Ibid.

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DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF SUCCESSIVE OFFENSIVES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 77-83

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col R. Savushkin: "On the Question of the Origin of the Theory of Successive Offensive Operations (1921-1929)"]

[Text] The theory of successive offensive operations began to be elaborated in our nation in the 1920's on the basis of generalizing the experience of World War I and the Civil War. Naturally, the Soviet military theoreticians gave particular attention to investigating the events closest to them, that is, the events of the Civil War. As the most typical example of successive operations, they took the offensive by the troops of the Western Front against the White Poles from the line along the Berezina River to the final line along the Vistula River (July-August 1920), in developing in the following manner (see Diagram 1).

On 4-7 July 1920, the Western Front successfully started the July Operation and dealt the enemy a severe defeat. Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the White Poles were forced to retreat. The armies of the Western Front went over to pursuit which lasted around a month. In the course of this, the enemy endeavored to check the Soviet troops on two lines (the first along the Nieman and Szara Rivers and the second along the Narew and Western Bug Rivers), where the advancing troops had to fight fierce engagements. Finally, on 9 August, the troops of the Western Front reached the line of Mlawa, Siedlce, Lubartow and from here commenced the "final offensive" (the engagement on the Vistula). However, the Polish Command was able to strengthen its troops and go over to a counteroffensive. Weakened in the previous battles and without reserves, the troops of the Western Front were forced to retreat to the line of Lipsk, Swislocz, 15 km to the east of Brest-Litovsk, where the further advance of the Polish armies halted.¹

In analyzing these events in his work "Pokhod za Vislu" [The Campaign for the Vistula] (1923), M. N. Tukhachevskiy concluded that it was impossible to defeat enemy armies that were prepared for war by a "single strike" and that this task had to be carried out **gradually**, by conducting a series of successive offensive operations. Only "a series of successively executed offensive operations connected by continuous pursuit," he wrote, "can replace the destructive




Diagram 2. Successive Offensive Operations by the German Army in the Western Theater in the 1914 Campaign

On the basis of the conducted research, N. N. Movchin concluded that "it was impossible under present-day conditions to rout the **entire** enemy army in a single operation."⁶ He was the first of the military theoreticians to propose that in successive operations one should establish: **the initial operation, the pursuit operation and the final operation.**⁷

In improving the theory of successive operations, an important role was played by the work of the Fourth Directorate of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Staff "Budushchaya voyna" [Future War] (1928) the elaboration of which involved M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Ya. K. Berzin, A. N. Nikonov and Ya. M. Zhigur. Along with other questions, it examined the nature of successive operations, the tasks carried out in the course of them and the conditions for achieving the ultimate goals. "...For destroying the enemy forces which with sufficient materiel and human resources as well as with a sufficient depth of the theater of war will constantly endeavor to feed and replenish themselves from the interior of the nation" the work pointed out, "it is essential to conduct a series of successive operations which are appropriately distributed in space and time. By a combination of a series of operations, it is essential to force the enemy to exhaust its material and human resources or to cause the enemy to accept a battle by its main mass of troops under disadvantageous conditions and eliminate them."⁸

The end to elaborating the theory of successive offensive operations in the 1920's was, in essence, the book by V. K. Triandafillov "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy" [The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies] (1929) which went through several editions⁹ as well as the work by A. K. Kolenkovskiy: "O nastupatel'noy operatsii armii, vkhodyashchey v sostav fronta" [On the Offensive Operation of an Army Which is Part of a Front] (1929). Thus, the theory of successive offensive operations was the outgrowth of the collective activities by many Soviet military theoreticians. It arose out of objective conditions and was based on historical experience.

In the series of successive frontal offensive operations, the initial operation holds a special place, as all successive ones depend upon its successful conclusion (see Diagram 3). In the course of this operation the basic enemy grouping should be defeated, forcing it to abandon the occupied defensive zone and retreat to rear lines in the aim of regrouping forces and bringing up reserves.




Diagram 3. Successive Operations of a Front
According to the Views of the 1920's

The impossibility of completely defeating the enemy grouping in the initial operation was explained primarily by the lack of long-range weapons among the advancing troops as well as by the deep operational configuration of the enemy troops on the defensive. According to foreign views in the 1920's, the first echelon divisions could occupy a defense to a depth of 4-6 km. The corps reserves were positioned 8-10 km behind the forward defensive edge. The army

reserves were 20-35 km away, a portion of the vehicle-mounted reserves was 80-100 km and the reserves of the army group even farther. "Even simultaneously with the initiating of combat," wrote V. K. Triandafillov, "the defenders take a whole series of measures to reinforce the attacked troops. Initially, the closest reserves are brought up here. If the center of the developing events is in a sector important from the viewpoint of conducting the war (and the operation), then deeper reserves can be brought up here as well as troops removed from other fronts (or areas of a front). If the reserves begin to arrive immediately and in sufficient numbers, then the operation can enter a new phase and be drawn out to a very long time...."¹⁰

With better conditions, it was considered possible to break through the enemy defensive front and threaten its flank and rear. However, the absence of means to carry out a decisive maneuver at a high pace as well as the low mobility of the advancing troops did not make it possible to anticipate the enemy in coming out on the route of retreat and prevent it from escaping from under the blow. All of this made it necessary to carry out following operations.

The aim of the pursuit operations was to deal a following partial defeat to the enemy and create conditions impeding the realization of its attempts by conducting a mobile (maneuvering) defensive to gain time, to regroup forces, to bring up reserves and form a new defensive front. The basic content of the given operations for the advancing side was continuous pursuit and simultaneously the preparation of the final operation.

The final operation arose, on the one hand, as a consequence of the reticence of the retreating side to lose the basic vital centers and thereby deprive itself of the possibility of further combat, and on the other, the desire of the pursuer to catch the enemy army and by seizing the designated centers to deprive it of the possibility of continuing the fight. The aim and main content of the final operation was to complete the defeat of the enemy armed forces in the given sector when the enemy had not succeeded in regrouping and reinforcing itself from reserves or had broken off the retreat due to the lack of free space (a sufficient depth of territory).

It was assumed that in practice the tasks of so-called "pursuit" could not be carried out in a single operation. The initial operation should be followed not by one, but rather by several "intermediate operations" leading the troops to the final operation.

The basic indicators for the successive offensive operations of a front are given in Table 1. As an average, the zone of advance for a front which included five armies in the initial position could be up to 400 km, the depth of the operation would be up to 250 km, the average pace would be 6-7 km and the duration 28-32 days.

The most typical methods of carrying out the tasks in the initial and final front-level operations were felt to be: a breakthrough with a further avalanching advance by the main forces toward the exposed flank and rear of the basic enemy grouping; a breakthrough with a subsequent frontal pressure and radiating offensive as one drove deeper into the enemy positions; a "concentric operation" or encirclement operation.¹² The most effective method was considered to be

Table 1

Basic Indicators for Successive Offensive Operations of a Front*

Type of Operation	Depth (km)	Pace (km/day)	Duration (in days)
Initial operation	30-50	5-6	5-6
Intermediate operations	150-200	8-10	18-20
Final operation	30-50	5-6	5-6
Average total	250	6-7	30

* Compiled on the basis of numerical data from the book: V. Triandafillov, "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy," pp 148, 157, 171, 184, 185-187 and so forth.

the encircling of the enemy as this, under favorable conditions, could lead to the destruction of a significant portion of its armed forces. However, such a method of combat operations, in the opinion of the authors, required a much larger number of troops than a frontal offensive. Considering that the Red Army then still did not have sufficient forces, the conclusion was drawn that "the present means and organization of the armies of our Western neighbors as well as the means of the Red Army do not ensure to any degree the success of such operations. The success of such operations with the present state of the armies can only be an accident."¹³

In working out operations involving the use of a frontal offensive, it was pointed out that under certain conditions only they could cause a defeat to the enemy. At the same time, one of the works of V. K. Triandafillov emphasized: "Such a ram (that is, a frontal strike.--Author), even if it is on the correctly chosen operational sector, cannot produce great results with that rate of developing combat operations which is inherent to modern weapons. With such a strike, the main enemy forces, if they consider battle under the given conditions unfavorable for themselves, will always be able to avoid battle and slip out from under the attack."¹⁴

The success of the operation was linked to the correct choice of the axis of the main thrust (or two thrusts in an encirclement operation), by the massing of resources on the selected sector and by the operational configuration of the troops. The main thrust and the ensuing maneuver by the advancing troops should be executed on an axis ensuring the coming out of a sufficiently strong grouping of the advancing side in an area of the enemy defenses which would threaten action against the operational-strategic flank or rear of the entire enemy grouping and disrupt its lines of communications.

The operational configuration of the front, judging from the works of M. N. Tukhachevskiy and V. K. Triandafillov, should consist of a single echelon and a reserve. The assault armies and armies of conventional composition were positioned in the first echelon.

The assault armies should play the leading role in a front-level operation. They were designed for an offensive in the sector of the main thrust (thrusts). They would solve the problem of massing the men and weapons in the selected sector. For this reason, each assault army was organized in such a manner that within the front operations it could carry out a series of successive operations with its own forces.

It was envisaged that the front of advance of an assault army would be around 50 km, including 25 km for the front of the main attack.¹⁵ The depth of an army operation, according to the ideas of those years, could vary from 25-30 km up to 50 km, the duration would be 5-6 days and the rate of advance 5-6 km a day.¹⁶

The concepts in the theory of successive frontal operations were tested out in 1928 in a command-staff game prepared by the RKKA Deputy Chief of Staff, V. K. Triandafillov. In the course of the military game, the initial operation was planned and the line of the final operation was designated. The pursuit operations were not planned as it was felt that it would be impossible to anticipate a change in the situation ahead of time. The front carrying out the successive operations included four armies. For increasing the effort they planned to bring up troops from the rear by rail and motor transport.¹⁷

The theory of successive offensive operations was an advanced one for its times. However, for successfully carrying it out it was essential to sufficiently equip the Red Army with the corresponding combat and technical means. Among such means, the authors of the work "Budushchaya voyna" put: 1) motorized rifle-machine gun units reinforced by high-speed tanks and motorized artillery; 2) large cavalry units reinforced with armor (armored cars and high-speed tanks) and guns and prepared for conducting dismounted and combined combat; 3) large airborne assault units. It was felt that without creating the listed formations with special weapons and organization, modern operations did not possess the prerequisites for the decisive destruction of the enemy.¹⁹

The successful carrying out of the First Five-Year Plan and in particular the First Five-Year Plan for military construction, made it possible to significantly increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Red Army gained the means for neutralizing enemy defenses and reserves and preventing the maneuvering of resources toward the breakthrough area. On this basis in the first and beginning of the second half of the 1930's (1930-1937), a new theory arose, the theory of deep combat and a deep offensive operation and this was the highest achievement of military art of those years.

In the new theory which was worked out on a higher technical base, the three types of operations (initial, intermediate and final) were merged into a single offensive operation, the aim of which was no longer the gradual destruction of the large enemy grouping by several operational efforts, but rather its complete destruction in the course of one operation. In a future war, as Triandafillov wrote, it would be possible "to merge the initial and subsequent operations into one continuous, protracted operation,"²⁰ that is, to have the successive operations which were drawn out in time and space and in which only a small portion of the enemy grouping would be "broken off" and

destroyed, formed a new operational-strategic unity, a destructive operation which completely rolled over the enemy grouping in a smaller space and in a shorter time than was required by a series of successive operations.

Thus, the idea of the complete destruction of a large enemy grouping in a single front-level operation was embodied in the 1930's in the theory of a deep offensive operation. Its basic ideas were carried out in the course of the offensive operations by the troops of the fronts and armies during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

¹ M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 1, Moscow, 1964, p 167.

² Ibid., p 142.

³ Ibid., pp 185-187.

⁴ M. N. Tukhachevskiy, N. Ye. Varfolomeyev, Ye. A. Shilovskiy, "Armeyskaya operatsiya. Rabota komandovaniya i polevogo upravleniya" [The Army Operation. The Work of the Command and Field Headquarters], edited by M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Voenizdat, 1926.

⁵ V. Triandafillov, "Razmakh operatsiy sovremennykh armiy" [The Scope of Operations of Modern Armies], Voenizdat, 1926, p 23.

⁶ N. Movchin, "Posledovatel'nyye operatsiy po opytu Marny i Visly" [Successive Operations from the Experience of the Marne and Vistula], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, otdel voyennoy literatury, 1928, p 40.

⁷ N. Movchin, op. cit., p 118.

⁸ TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33988, inv. 2, file 688, sheets 16-17.

⁹ V. K. Triandafillov perished in the summer of 1931 in an air crash. All the subsequent editions of his book were the same as the 1929 edition.

¹⁰ V. Triandafillov, "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy" [The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies], Gosvoenizdat, 1936, p 149.

¹¹ [Not in text.]

¹² M. N. Tukhachevskiy, N. Ye. Verfolomeyev, Ye. A. Shilovskiy, "Armeyskaya operatsiya...", pp 59, 70.

¹³ TsGASA, folio 33988, inv. 2, file 688, sheet 18.

¹⁴ V. Triandafillov, "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh...", p 205.

¹⁵ Ibid., p 140.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp 147-148, 288.

¹⁷ TsGASA, folio 37977, inv. 3, file 209, sheets 1-20.

¹⁸ [Not in text.]

¹⁹ TsGASA, folio 33988, inv. 2, file 688, sheets 18-19.

²⁰ V. Triandafillov, "Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh...", p 178.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARMY GEN I. N. SHKADOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 26 Apr 83) pp 89-91

[Article by Mar SU S. Sokolov: "Army Gen I. N. Shkadov (on His 70th Birthday)"]

[Text] The USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel, Army Gen I. N. Shkadov is celebrating his 70th birthday. He was born on 2 May 1913, in the village of Naumovo, now Spas-Demenskiy Rayon of Kaluga Oblast, in a family of hereditary grain growers. Like all peasant children, he learned about work early on in helping his father on the farm.

In 1931, having completed the Spas-Demensk Unified Labor School Second Degree, I. Shkadov worked in the Spas-Demenskiy and Nelidovski Rayon Komsomol Commissions and in the local soviets of Nelidovski Rayon of Kalinin Oblast.

In 1935, I. N. Shkadov entered the Gorkiy (later Kharkov) Armored School, where he joined the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] in March 1938.

The 1930's were a disquieting and troubled time. In 1933, the leading circles of German imperialism brought Hitler's party to power and in the East the possibilities of military conflict became evermore real. Lt I. N. Shkadov requested serving precisely here in the Far East after completing school, for, as a graduate of the first category, he had the right to choose his place of further service.

He was appointed the commander of a tank platoon in the Second Mechanized Brigade of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army. The brigade was preparing for exercises and the young lieutenant had to pass a practical exam in controlling the platoon in training combat.

But life determined otherwise. The platoon commander, like other lieutenants who had just arrived from the military schools, had to take a more serious exam of commander maturity in a real combat situation. And this happened at the end of July 1938, when the Second Mechanized Brigade of Col A. P. Panfilov and the 32d Rifle Division of Col N. E. Berzarin was sent to the area of Khasan for aiding the units of the 40th Rifle Division of Col V. K. Bazarev on the occasion of the broadening of the military conflict in this area.

Lt I. N. Shkadov led his subordinates into combat repeatedly. Under his leadership, the tank troops destroyed enemy personnel and equipment and with their fire and tracks crushed the enemy firing emplacements. In one of the battles, the commander's tank of I. N. Shkadov was hit, but the officer did not leave the battlefield. On another tank where the commander had been hit, he continued to carry out the combat task and directed the actions of his subordinates. The Order of the Red Star which was presented to him in the Kremlin by M. I. Kalinin was a worthy assessment of both the command and the purely human qualities of Ivan Nikolayevich [Shkadov], an assessment of his ability to endure the first battle and his capacity to successfully carry out combat tasks.

The Great Patriotic War found Ivan Nikolayevich in the position of the chief of staff of a tank flamethrower battalion and he took direct part in combat operations in the region of Bryansk, Trubchevsk and Novgorod-Severskiy in the position of deputy chief of staff for intelligence of the 216th Tank Regiment of the 108th Tank Division, where he immediately proved himself and was awarded the Order of Lenin. The presentation of this high decoration states:

"On 19 November 1941, in a battle in the area of Novo-Moskovsk, in commanding a company of heavy tanks, he drove the enemy out of the village of Ogarevka and held it for 24 hours. In the morning of 20 November, in repelling attacks, 19 enemy tanks were destroyed. On 23 November 1941, in the battle for the village of Teploye, in directing the battle, he destroyed 2 medium tanks, a mortar battery, an antitank battery and up to a platoon of enemy infantry. On 24 November 1941, in commanding the southwestern sector in the defense of Venev, he engaged 30 enemy tanks, and destroyed 4 tanks and up to a company of enemy infantry."¹

I. N. Shkadov did not count the kilometers of his frontline roads. Nor did he count the cities and villages which he had to liberate, the crossed water obstacles or the number of battles. The war introduced a difficult, dangerous, but essential obligation into his life and required the fulfilling of the duty of a Soviet soldier and citizen to defend the freedom and independence of the motherland and the great victories of October. He, like many other millions of sons and daughters of our multinationalist fatherland, honestly and conscientiously fulfilled his duty.

A particularly difficult burden rested on the shoulders of Officer I. N. Shkadov when at Stalingrad during the difficult November days of 1942 he was appointed the commander of the 52d Separate Tank Regiment. Under his leadership, the regiment participated in the battles on the Manych Canal, for Kotelnikovo and Novocherkassk, to the north of Rostov, it crossed the Mius River, it participated in the liberation of Dneprodzerzhinsk and in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, and it conducted combat operations against the Nazi troops in Romania and later on the territory of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 33, inv. 682524, file 242, sheet 302.

In being successively part of the 2d, 3d and 8th Guards, the 5th Assault, 37th and 57th Armies, the 52d Second Tank Regiment was used, as a rule, in the most responsible areas of combat operations. Together with the rifle units, it broke through the enemy defenses, it was committed to battle for exploiting the success on the offensive, it repeatedly covered breaches in the defenses, it participated in counterattacks and made raids against the enemy rear. Whatever mission was given the regiment, Ivan Nikolayevich did everything within his power to deal the enemy a decisive defeat with minimum losses of men and equipment. Under his command, the regiment became Red Banner and received the name of Dneprodzerzhinsk and was awarded the Order of Suvorov.

I. N. Shkakov ended the Great Patriotic War in the position of commander of the 96th Shumlin Tank Brigade imeni the Chelyabinsk Komsomol. During postwar times, he commanded a heavy tank regiment and was the deputy commander of a mechanized division and later a commander of a tank division. After completing the Military Academy of the General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov in 1959, he held a number of responsible positions in the troops and for 3 years was the deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District.

For a number of years, I. N. Shkadov was in Cuba as the senior person in charge of the group of Soviet military specialists and the head consultant of the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces. He provided effective help in solving important questions relating to the organizational development of the young republic's Army and Navy. He generously shared his broad knowledge and rich combat experience. For this he won the profound respect of the leaders of the fraternal country.

Army Gen I. N. Shkadov is vice president of the Society of Soviet-Cuban Friendship.

After returning from his official mission, I. N. Shkadov commanded the Northern Group of Forces, he was the first deputy chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff and from July 1969, the chief of the Main Directorate of Military Schools [GUVUZ] of the Ministry of Defense. Over this time, the system of training officer candidates was improved considering the requirements of modern combat, the training specialties were revised for the officer personnel and the training plans and programs were adjusted. Under the leadership of Ivan Nikolayevich, the GUVUZ has carried out extensive scientific research to determine the optimum level of knowledge for the students and officer candidates and much has been done to bring theory closer to practice and improve the training system of military personnel.

In August 1972, I. N. Shkadov was appointed the chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and in 1982 became USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel. In this responsible position he has done extensive work to strengthen our officer corps and to train and place military personnel in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Ivan Nikolayevich has periodically published articles on the problems of improving work with the military personnel in the military press and these questions have been generalized by him in the works "Kadry Sovetskoy Armii i Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [The Personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy] and "Lyudi geroicheskoy professii" [People of a Heroic Profession].

There is one other area of activities by the communist I. N. Shkadov which must be mentioned. I have in mind his responsible duties as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Meetings with voters, reports to them on work done, correspondence with organizations, officials and persons turning to him with various proposals, advice and requests--this is a far from complete list of those questions which the people's representative must solve. Ivan Nikolayevich carefully examines each received letter and does everything possible to help the voter, for behind each letter he sees a living person with his joys and sadness.

On the occasion of the 70th birthday of Ivan Nikolayevich Shkadov, his combat friends wish him good health and success in carrying out those great and responsible tasks which the 26th CPSU Congress has posed for the Armed Forces.

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